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RHODES, PATRICK LAWSON. Behavioral and Humanistic Curriculum 
models: A Dilemma Reconciliation Approach. (1981) Directed 
by: Dr. Dwight F. Clark, Jr. Pp. 138. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to describe an 
emerging psychological synthesis and its relation to signi-
ficant curricular dilemmas. It proposes that it is useful 
to treat curricular questions from a unified and broader 
perspective and to deal with the paradoxes that arise, 
rather than take a narrow and exclusive approach. It 
attempts to effect a tentative re~onciliation between two 
apparently oppositional models of psychology and education, 
behaviorism and humanism. 
This dilemma can be summed up as the recognition that 
both behavioral and humanistic models are useful and 
productive in their application to curricular processes. 
However, these models are usually represented as mutually 
exclusive and oppositional in their philosophies and 
operational realities. Thus, the question of which, if 
either, is the better approach poses a dilemma for 
curriculum workers. 
This essay, justified, in part, by scholarly writings 
in education and psychology which deal with this dilemma, 
builds on earlier works in the same general area. 
The procedures employed include source selection, the 
compilation and review of appropriate literature, expli-
cation of approaches to reconciliation, and recommendations 
for research and action. 
As a way to tying together this collection of literature, 
ten ideas about curriculum are proposed. This is an 
arbitrary number of ideas; however, they represent the 
combinations best summarizing the essence of the literature 
that provides assumptions for developing a model. 
The collection of related literature aids in providing 
a base for the support of a reconciliation approach to 
behavioral and humanistic curriculum mo·dels. It is organized 
into two sections. 
The first part, "Curriculum Conflict," is included to 
illustrate that the curriculum field consists of a diversity 
of conceptions and approaches. Unresolved problems that 
exacerbate conflict in the field are reviewed. 
The second section, "Dilemma and Reconciliation," shows 
that there has been a clear split in the behavioral and 
humanistic approaches that are now emerging into a new 
synthesis. 
Next, three approaches to reconciliation are explained 
and illustrated with figures. A synthesizing approach, a 
simultaneous approach, and a convergent approach are 
presented as a broad set of alternatives for conceptualizing 
the reconciliation of the behavioral-humanistic dilemma in 
curriculum and instruction and can be considered exploratory 
and tentative. They are not tied together in a model that 
is characterized as "comprehensive"; however, ·their 
complementarity is apparent. 
Finally, it is suggested that the frameworks presented 
will be transcended eventually, and several new directions 
for going beyond current frameworks are listed. Additionally, 
seven recommendations for action and research centering on 
the reconciliation of the behavioral-humanistic dilemma in 
curriculum and instruction are suggested, and a brief 
epilogue is presented. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
l'lJy personal curriculum is a part of a larger personal 
journey and consists of a collection of educational 
experiences that I find similar to Fisher's (1966) ideas. 
She wrote that the nature of one's personal understanding of 
the teaching-learning confrontation is a unifying center 
from which curriculum tends to be viewed as undivided. Part 
of my personal curriculum consists of my formal educational 
experiences, about which I will briefly ~ornment. 
I had not planned to pursue doctoral study in the field 
of curriculum and teaching; however, because of fortunate, 
and almost accidental, contact with certain professors and 
graduate students in the School of Education, I shifted my 
interests in the direction of this diverse and complex area 
of study. ~tr personal curriculum includes a student career 
that spans three elementary schools, tl'IO middle schools, one 
high school, seven colleges and universities, and military 
training. I have come to see this personal curriculum as 
being remarkable for both its standardization and uniqueness. 
This paradox is understandable in view of the relative 
consistency of the curriculum in American schools, and the 
relative inconsistency of its effect on any one particular 
person. From a personal point of view, I am certain that no 
one experiences the identical curriculum and that each of us 
has our own personal curriculum. As a result of running 
this course, I have developed interests in education, 
sociology, counseling, and psychology. Combining these 
academic interests with my concern with teaching makes my 
entry into curriculum discourse seem a natural capstone to 
my formal educational career. 
I have begun to conceptualize curriculum and teaching 
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as an interactive process between behavioral and humanistic 
models, and I admit that my conceptualizations are a function 
of my own personal curriculum and have been influenced 
strongly by the professors in my doctoral program. 
I was influenced by a lecture presented by P. Scott 
Lawrence on June 26, 1979, which explored some of the issues 
in the behavioral-humanist dilemma. Lawrence asserted that 
there was little difference between the humanistic concern 
for "human understanding" and the behavioral concept of 
"prediction and control" and that the "active versus passive" 
argument is outdated. He asked if humanists really deal with 
the whole person, and if it is accurate to characterize 
behaviorists as "cold, isolated individuals." He questioned 
whether the objective approach detracts from subjective 
aesthetics and related that his objective understanding of 
rainbows as refractory phenomena does not diminish his 
subjective appreciation for them as beautiful events. He 
pointed out the commonalities shared by behavioral and 
humanistic approaches, which include increasing freedom, 
teaching self-control, and opposing aversive control. That 
lecture, a part of my personal curriculum, stimulated me to 
explore the reconciliation of the behavioral-humanist 
dilemma. 
This essay is part of my personal curriculum, and I 
recognize that its purpose emerges from those experiences. 
Purpose 
3 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explain an 
emerging psychological synthesis and its relation to 
significant curriculum dilemmas. This essay is, in a sense, 
a philosophical dissertation, focusing on a philosophy as it 
is operationalized in two models of psychology. Two 
approaches to psychology, behaviorism and humanism, are 
important antecedents and correlates of curriculum processes 
and can be related. Numerous paradoxes emerge in this 
relationship and will be viewed as dilemmas to be reconciled 
rather than as problems to be solved. This reconciliation 
could be effected within several different approaches to 
philosophy and psychology, and a reconciliation that takes 
into account all aspects of those different approaches and 
their interrelationships might be ideal. Such a compre-
hensive reconciliation mPy be a possibility some day; 
however, it is beyond the scope of this present essay. I 
will focus on a segment of such a comprehensive reconcili-
ation. MY hope is that it will provide impetuEJ in the 
direction of more comprehensive models, and I believe that 
they can, and more importantly should, be conceptualized to 
aid curriculum in becoming a more coherent, communicable, 
and potent force for educational practice. 
4 
The purpose of this study is to advocate the 
reconciliation of diverse and polar curricular approaches 
into a broader perspective. The purpose includes a review 
of the related literature, model generation, explication of 
approaches to reconciliation, and recommendations for action 
and research implied by a broader perspective. 
The Unity of All Things 
The caption on this section is borrowed from a chapter 
title in ~he Ta~of ~~sics (Capra, 1975), which presents a 
reconciliation between Western science and Eastern mysticism. 
This reconciliation will not be relied on to provide a 
theoretical base for the present essay but rather to 
illustrate that a seemingly impossible task is, in fact, 
realizable. Capra writes that 
The most important characteristic of the Eastern world 
view--one could almost sav the essence of it--is the u 
awareness of the unity and the mutual interrelation of 
all things and events, the experience of all phenomena 
in the world as manifestations of a basic oneness. All 
things are seen as interdependent and inseparable parts 
of this cosmic whole; as different manifestations of 
the same ultimate reality. The Eastern traditions 
constantly refer to this ultimate, indivisible reality 
which manifests itself in all things, and of which all 
things are parts. It is called Brahman in Hinduism, 
Dharmaka~a in Buddhism, Tao in Taoism:- Because it 
transcen s all concepts and categoriest Buddhists also 
call it ~at~ata, or Suchness. (p. 117; 
Capra continues by pointing out the similarity of this 
perspective to the views of modern physics: 
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The basic oneness of the universe is not only the central 
characteristic of the mystical experience, but it is 
also one of the most important revelations of modern 
physics. It becomes apparent at the atomic level and 
manifests itself more and more as one penetrates deeper 
into matter, down into the realm of subatomic particles. 
The unity of all things and events will be a recurring 
theme throughout our comparison of modern physics and 
Eastern philosophy. As we study the various models of 
subatomic physics we shall see that they express again 
and again, in different ways, the same insight--that the 
constituents of matter and the basic phenomena involving 
them are all interconnected, interrelated and inter-
dependent; that they cannot be understood as isolated 
entities, but only as integrated parts of the whole. 
(p. 118) 
Clark Kerr (1972) said that a major task facing what he 
terms the "City of Intellect," or the university community, 
is to create a more unified intellectual world (p. 119). 
The focus of this unification is the drawing together of 
knowledge rather than its fragmentation. In a similar vein, 
Arthur Staats (1975) has taken a position against inter- and 
intra-disciplinary separatism and isolationism (p. 584). He 
states that we must strive for unification and principles 
that have general applicability to various concerns. 
Noll (1980) has noted a lack of unity in curricular 
approaches, which he characterizes as polar approaches 
emphasizing "basics" and "humanism." He writes that 
advocates of the basics movement in curriculum respond to 
11 the widely perceived need for clrlri ty and certainty. ~~ost 
people believe that there are skills and knowledge which 
every person should have and \'Ihich the schools should be 
responsible for teaching" (p. 35). However, .Noll points out 
that within the field of curriculum 
a movement fueled by humanistic psychology and the 
philosophical viewpoints of existential phenomenolo~y 
has gained some momentum and offers specifications of 
a general view that stands for greater curricular 
emphasis on self-fulfillment, personal liberty, social 
justice, diversity, and pluralism. (p. 35) 
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He notes that the issues of freedom, control, and motivation 
within an educational context come from two major camps in 
educational psycholo~y: the behaviorists and the humanists 
(p. 37). 
The present essay will attempt to be additive in the 
drawing together of knowledge within the context of 
curriculum theory and practice. It is my intent to encourage 
dialogue rather than argument, and reconciliation rather than 
isolationism. That this dialogue can occur within the frame-
work of curriculum theory and practice is evidenced by the 
present state of curriculum studies. It is a field with a 
thoughtful literature; however, it is a young field open to 
fresh conceptualizations and new insights. It will be said 
that curriculum theory, an area around which educational 
practice should ce~ter, has yet to become potent. If 
curriculum theory is the foundation upon which educational 
practices are built, then it is reasonable to assert that 
its task is to become more influential than it is now. 
Further, it can be assumed that a reconciliation of signi-
ficant positions in curriculum theory will increase its 
influence on educational practice. 
7 
Commenting on the scope of the curriculum field and 
conceptualizations of curriculum, ~oodlad (1979) has written: 
The problem of the practitioner is to gain perspective, 
to see connected things as related. The problem of the 
theoretician is to stay sufficiently close to practice 
to avoid assuming his own, probably preferred, world of 
action. It has been my belief that the prime criterion 
to be satisfied by an reasonably adequate conceptual 
system in the field of curriculum is that it would 
provide both perspective for the practitioner and 
portray practice for the theorist. I see it as a bridge 
between the conduct of practice and the effort to 
develop concepts and theories. (p. 19) 
Curriculum theory and practice can be described as a 
constellation of diverse approaches and conceptualizations. 
From Ralph Tyler's behavioral objectives approach to David 
Purpel's humanistic ideas (Purpel, 1972), curriculum theory 
presents itself as a somewhat loose continuum of approaches 
with a variety of other conceptualizations in between. 
Additionally, the scope of curricular conceptualizations 
ranges from limited and specialized foci to all encompassing 
views. 
This diversity in approaches and scope emerges from a 
common ground upon which all attempt to approach the same 
8 
collection of phenomena known as "curriculum." Although 
various positions may be described as oppositional 
polarities, they are all apparent polarities within the same 
context. That is not to assert that they are all describing 
the identical phenomenon, for there exists variation in the 
definition of "curriculum." Hm·rever, there is agreement that 
"curriculum" is important enough to be considered a 
specialized field of study. Accordingly, the variation in 
curricular approaches has resulted in controversy, and this 
controversy will be the focus of this inquiry. 
Statement of the Dilemma 
The dilemma that this paper will review and attempt to 
reconcile is an apparent polarity in curricular thinking 
that has a parallel in therapeutic psychology. This dilemma 
is posed by the existence of two influential, either in 
practice or in the literature, curricular models: the 
allegedly 11 behavioral 11 approach and the so-called "humanistic" 
model. That this dilemma exists also in psychological 
thought, in a some,.rhat purer form, will be demonstrated. 
Both curricular models appear to be useful within an educa-
tional context, and both psychological models appear useful 
within a therapeutic context. However, these approaches seem 
to be oppositional in their underlying assumptions and 
operational realities. Thus, the question of which, if 
either, is the better approach in terms of curriculum and 
teaching should be addressed. 
Justifica~ 
This essay is justified and supported by scholarly 
literature in four related areas: psychology, general 
education, the doctoral dissertations in curriculum and 
instruction, and curriculum theory. 
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The psychological literature bas treated the behaviorist-
humanist split philosophically, as it relates to counseling 
and psychotherapy, and as it relates to learning. Hitt 
(1969), Gelso (1970), Saleebey (1975), Poppen, Wandersman & 
Wandersman (1976), Avila & Purkey (1977), and Krasner (1978) 
are among those making contributions in this area. 
General education articles by Cohen & Hersh (1972), 
Duman (1973), Smith (1973), and Fitt (1976) have explored 
the meaning of the behavioral-humanist dilemma for educators. 
Although there seems to be an obvious connection to the 
psychological literature cited in the preceding paragraph, 
none of these articles are cited by the educationally 
oriented writers. 
The doctoral literature in curriculum and instruction 
shows that a considerable amount of energy has been expended, 
both broadly and statistically, on conceptual or empirical 
studies in either behavioral or humanistic approaches to 
curriculum and education. However, with one exception, the 
10 
behavioral-humanist dilemma has not been addressed. Swaim 
(1973) wrote an exploratory dissertation, the title of which 
is B • ..:_~-· ~!!!!!~-~!!d C~!:! __ :g~gers on Behavior and Education. 
The abstract indicates tb~t Swaim had limited success in 
achieving a reconciliation. 
The fourth area of literature which justifies this study 
consists of the writings in curriculum which advocate 
improvement and new directions in curriculum theorizing 
especially in regard to relating theor.y to practice. Typical 
of these are works by Huebner (1976) and Goodlad (1979). 
In short, these writings indicate an increased interest 
by curriculists and other educators in the implications of 
both behavioral and humanistic models for educational 
practice. An accompanying confusion resulting from the 
conflicting claims and oppositional viewpoints of proponents 
of both models is also evident. The literature points to 
the fact that these models are, to some degree, reconcilable 
and that a contribution can be made by alleviating the 
confusion surrounding what appears to be a conflict. 
Procedures 
The procedures employed in this effort to accomplish the 
broad purpose include a selection of sources, the compilation 
and review of those sources, explication of approaches to 
reconciliation, and action and research recommendations. 
11 
A systematic search for sources considered likely to 
reveal literature related to this study was conducted. 
Dissertation indices and abstracts from 1861 to February 
1981 (Dissertation Abstracts International) were examined to 
determine if the doctoral literature in curriculum and 
instruction justifies and supports this essay. It is note-
worthy that the first dissertation identified in the indices 
as dealing with curriculum was written by Frank P. Bachman 
at Columbia University in 1902 and was entitled The Public 
~lementa~§£hool of En~land. A search of the Current Index 
to Journals in Education from 1971 to February 1981 for 
related literature under the headings of "behaviorism," 
"humanism," and curriculum related identifiers was carried 
• 
out. The ~~~chological Abstracts from 19?1 to l\1arch 1981 
were scrutinized under the headings "behaviorism," 
"humanism," and identifiers related to history and 
philosophy of psychology. Bound volumes with the Library 
of Congress classification for curriculum (LB 1570) that 
were available in the university library were searched. 
Additionally, bibliographies from the sources selected 
yielded appropriate citations that, in some instances, 
predate those contained in the indices utilized in this 
study. 
A somewhat unsystematic collection of sources was also 
pursued during the course of the literature search. Some 
sources were recommended by those familiar with this essay, 
12 
and others result~d from accidental discoveries or a subjec-
tive perception that they were congruent with the body of the 
systematically discovered sources. 
The next procedure focused on a critical review of the 
literature in two areas. First, the literature relating to 
the split between and the reconciliation of behaviorism and 
humanism within a psychological context was examined. This 
literature shows that a split has existed and presents 
evidence that a reconciliation is a vital concern that is 
being addressed in the literature. Much of this literature 
can be considered from a broader perspective in psychology; 
however, it is seen that important contributions are being 
made from the applied areas of therapeutic psychology • 
• 
Second, literature explicating dichotomous and also polar 
approaches in curriculum theory and practice was reviewed. 
This review demonstrates that there exists a parallel with 
the psychological literature that has significant 
implications for the curricular dilemma. This parallel 
may lead to a broader perspective within which the dilemma 
may be reconciled. That this curricular dilemma may be 
conceptualized as a behaviorist-humanist schism is 
demonstrated. 
Sources supplementing the two major areas were also 
reviewed. These sources included literature from education 
and psychology as well as from other areas. The 
13 
compilation of the selected related literature in this paper 
is a procedure that may be a contribution in itself. 
The approaches to reconciliation to be described in this 
essay focus on the explication of a creative reality implied 
by the two areas reviewed and, in turn, generate recommen-
dations for action and research. The approaches described 
are not an attempt to propose a grand system, but rather are 
to interpret and draw together related concepts and to serve 
as a useful base from which curriculum may be conceptualized. 
Definitions 
Scheffler (1960) has proposed an analytic framework 
for definitions in education. He proposes three types of 
• 
general definitions: "stipulative," "descriptive," and 
"programmatic." 
Stipulative definitions are "to be understood in a 
special way for the space of some discourse or throughout 
several discourses of a certain type" (p. 13). Stipulative 
definitions are either "inventive" or "noninventive" 
depending on whether the term has such a prior usage. 
Descriptive definitions may also contain discussion 
conventions; however, they also account for prior usage. 
"Every such definition is construable as a formula equating 
a defined term with other, defining, terms in a way that 
purports to mirror predefinitional usage" (p. 15). 
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Desc~iptive definitions do not have the arbitrary quality of 
stipulative definitions. 
Programmatic definitions act as expressions of practical 
programs. 
To propose a definition that now assigns such a term 
to some new thing may in context be a way of conveying 
that this new thing ought to be accorded the sort of 
practical treatment given to things hitherto referred to 
by the term in question. Similarly, to propose a 
definition that withholds such a term from an object to 
which it has hitherto applied may be a way of conveying 
that the object in question ought no longer be treated 
as the things referred to by the given term have been 
treated. Even if a definition is proposed that assigns 
the term just exactly to the ob~ects to which it has 
hitherto applied and to no others, the point at stake 
may be to defend the propriety of the current practical 
orientation to such objects and to no others, rather 
than (or as "'ell as) to mirror predefinitional usage. 
(p. 19) 
A definition that does any of these three things is 
programmatic and embodies context as well as practical 
consequences in its usage. 
Scheffler described educational slogans which he says 
are "unsystematic, less solemn in manner, more popular, to 
be repeated warmly or reassuringly rather than pondered 
gravely" (p. 36). He believes that educational slogans are 
rallying symbols for the key ideas and attitudes of educa-
tional movements rather than important figures in the 
explan~tion of educational theories. These slogans do not 
necesse.rily claim to facilitate communications or reflect 
meanings as do definitions, according to Scheffler. 
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Scheffler offered two definitions of the term ~rriculum 
which are employed in this study. One definition is that 
curriculum is "the school's formal course of study" (p. 26), 
and the other is that the curriculum "is defined as referring 
to the totality of experience of each learner under the 
influence of the school" (p. 23). Scheffler noted that this 
latter definition "has an intended consequence that no two 
pupils ever have the same curriculum and, further, that no 
two schools ever have the same curriculum, each school 
having as many curricula as it has pupils" (p. 23). The 
first definition may be construed as either descriptive or 
programmatic depending on the context. The second definition, 
he asserted, is programmatic; however, since he cited 
• 
Frederick (1941) as a source of this definition, it is 
likely, since forty years have passed, that it is evolving 
into a descriptive definition. From the perspective of 
stipulative definitions, both definitions do, in effect, 
stipulate that the curriculum is the responsibility of the 
schools. There is an apparent overlapping of these two 
definitions, and it would seem that the first could be 
absorbed into the second. This study considers them 
separate and programmatic definitions which are useful in 
the examination of curricular questions. 
This section will focus on the explanation of the 
general usage of "behaviorism" and "humanism," two terms 
central to the concepts in this paper. These stipulations 
16 
have usages that encompass numerous meanings, and concise but 
lucid definitions are not possible. In fact, one expert 
(Krasner, 1978) has written, "I \'rill not attempt to define 
either term--it would be too difficult. Reading the 
ponderous literature on both sides only results in confusion" 
(p. 800). In an effort to avoid this confusion, a collection 
of balanced definitions from the literature is presented. 
Although it could be said that from Scheffler's viewpoint 
either term could be a descriptive definition, or even an 
educational slogan, their arbitrary quality classifies them 
as stipulative definitions in the noninnovative sense. 
Hitt (1969) offered definitions of behaviorism and 
humanism which he asserted are the "heart of the argument" 
4 
(p. 652). This writer defined the two positions by 
describing the assumptions held by behaviorists and humanists: 
The behaviorist views man as a passive organism governed 
by external stimuli. Man can be manipulated through 
proper control of these stimuli. Moreover, the laws 
that govern men are essentially the same as the laws · 
that govern all natural phenomena of the 1trorld; hence, 
it is assumed that the scientific method used by the 
physical scientist is equally appropriate to the study 
of man. 
The humanist, on the other hand, 
views man as the source of acts; he is free to choose in 
each situation. The essence of man is inside of man; be 
is controlled by his own consciousness. The most 
appropriate methodology for the study of man is phenome-
nology, which begins with the world of experience. 
Poppen, Wandersman and Wandersman (1976) asserted that 
the breadth and diversity of humanistic and behavioral 
approaches make it difficult to summarize the two positions 
as each is a variety of theories, assumptions, and 
techniques. These authors pointed out the commonalities 
inherent in each position as a means by which they may be 
defined. Behavioristic positions are characterized by the 
use of experimental evidence in systematic factual inquir.y. 
"There is concern for objectivity, replication of results, 
and the use of a rigorous scientific method" (p. 4), in 
addition to a focus on the environment rather than inner 
caus~s as determinants of behavior. ' Commonalities in 
humanistic thought include an ''insistence on a human model 
for a human psychology which is distinct from models which 
account for animal or mechanical behavior" (p. 5). In 
• 
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addition, humanists believe that human beings must be 
studied as conscious agents with feelings, ideals, and 
intentions which are important to the understanding of 
behavior. The authors added that "such a view of human 
beings has led to a concern with human growth, personal 
fulfillment, and self-actualization" (p. 5). These authors 
also clarified the often confused distinction between 
humanism an~ humanitarianism. They noted that 
Humanitarianism refers to a concern for the interests of 
mankind, for instance, in solving human problems and 
relieving human suffering. In this way both behaviorism 
and humanism can be humanitarian, and in most instances 
are. But there is nothing about the two positions which 
logically requires a behaviorist or a humanist to be 
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humanitarian. Humanism refers to a focus on distinctive~ 
human interests, but this focus need not be humanitarian. 
This distinction is important because a number of claims 
for a combination of behaviorism and humanism are in 
actuality combinations of behaviorism and humanitarianism. 
(p. 5, fn) 
Lefrancois (1979) defined these two terms. Behaviorism, 
he wrote, 
denotes those theories that are concerned with the 
observables of behavior--that is, \orith the visible 
aspects of behavior: stimuli (that which leads to 
behavior) and responses (the behavior itself). The term 
was coined by J. B$ Watson (1913) in his article 
"Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It." (p. 9) 
Lefrancois also defined humanism and pointed out that 
The term humanism is employed in psychology to describe 
an orientation that is primarily concerned with the 
humanity of people--\ori th those characteristics of a 
person that are assumed to make us most human. ~umanists 
deal largely with the affective (emotional) aspects of 
human behavior. They are interested in explaining our 
relationship to the world and to other people and in 
learning how an individual feels about things. The 
theory of Carl Rogers is one example of a humanistic 
position. (p. 9) 
"Teaching" and "learning" are terms that will be used in 
this paper, and characteristic definitions from both 
behavioral and humanistic perspectives will be helpful. 
According to the behavioral literature, "teaching is simply 
the arrangement of contingencies of reinforcement" (Skinner, 
1968, p. 5), and learning is a significant change in 
behavior (Skinner, 1968, p. 10). From the humanistic stand-
point, teaching is the "facilitation of change and learning" 
through the "personal relationship between the facilitator 
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and the learner" (Rogers, 1969, pp. 104-106). A brief 
definition of learning from this same source is that it is 
"significant, meaningful, and experiential," involves self-
discovery, and includes both "thoughts and feelings" (p. 4). 
The present study describes model building, and 
Brubaker's (1978) definition of this process is employed. 
He has defined "model building" as 
the process whereby one attempts to convey the essential 
features of a particular reality through a construct 
whose elements and their relationships to each other and 
the whole are described. The model can then lead to 
theories, experimental studies, and other forms of 
research. (p. 23) 
Macdonald (1975) has also outlined a similar process for 
model building which has four elements: "basic intentions," 
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"value assumptions," "the model," and "conclusions." The 
first element, basic intentions, specifies whether the model 
formulator's purposes are for "control," "understanding," or 
"liberation." The second part of the process is a specifi-
cation of value assumptions about the "cosmos" and human 
nature. The model itself is presented next, and, "once 
constructed, must have boundaries, variables, and specify 
the relationships among the variables" (p. 35). The fourth 
part of the model will present conclusions including new 
insights and the practical applications of the model. 
The term "behavioral objectives" are stipulated as being 
part of the larger behavioral model for the purposes of 
this essay. Difficulties arise from either the exclusion or 
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inclusion of behavioral objectives procedures from the 
behavioral model. This term could be stipulated as not 
being part of the behavioral model as it does not usually 
define contingencies as the behaviorist understands them. 
However, educational journals and indices treat this term as 
though it were part of the larger behavioral model, and 
numerous writers make the assumption that this is true. 
Since common usage appears to support the inclusion of 
"behavioral objectives" within the behavioral model, this 
essay will use the term "behavioral objectives" in that 
manner .and will address the consequences for educational 
practice in so doing. 
§ummary 
This essay emerges from the writer's own personal 
curriculum and asserts that one's personal understanding of 
the teaching-learning confrontation is a unifying center 
from which curriculum tends to be viewed as undivided. In 
this effort, curriculum and teaching are conceptualized as 
an interactive process bet'l'reen behavioral and humanistic 
models, although there is an awareness that there are other 
ways to view curriculum. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to describe an 
emerging psychological synthesis and its relation to signi-
ficant curricular dilemmas. It proposes that it is useful 
to treat curricular questions from a unified and broader 
perspective and to deal with the paradoxes that arise, 
rather than take a narrow and exclusive approach. It 
attempts to effect a tentative reconciliation between two 
apparently oppositional models of psychology and education, 
behaviorism and humanism. 
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The dilemma that this paper deals with can be summed up 
as the recognition that both behavioral and humanistic 
models are useful and productive in their application to 
curricular processes. However, these models are usually 
represented as mutually exclusiv·e and oppositional in their 
philosophies and operational realities. Thus, the question 
of which, if either, is the better approach poses a dilemma 
for curriculum workers. • 
This essay is justified, in part, by scholarly writings 
in education and psychology which deal with this dilemma. 
It builds on earlier works in the same general area. There 
has been only one effort on the dissertation level by 
doctoral students in curriculum, and this dissertation will 
attempt to make a contribution by filling that void. 
The procedures employed include source selection, the 
compilation and review of appropriate literature, explication 
of model approaches to reconciliation, and recommendations 
for action and research. Every effort has been made to be 
objective and systematic while allowing for a subjective and 
unsystematic dimension to this essay. 
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Important terms that have been defined in the intro-
duction include "curriculum," "behaviorism," "humanism," 
"humanitarianism," "teaching," "learning," "model building," 
and the relationship of "behavioral objectives" to the 
larger-behavior model has been clarified. These definitions 
are for the purposes of this study, and it is recognized 
that other, equally valid definitions of the same terms 
exist. 
Introduction 
CHAPI'ER II 
RELATED LITERATURE 
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This collection of related literature provides a base 
for the support of a reconciliation approach to behavioral 
and humanistic curriculum models. It is organized into two 
sections~ the first focusing on general conceptions of 
curriculum, and the second dealing specifically with the 
reconciliation of the behaviorist-humanist dilemma. 
The first part, "Curriculum Conflict," is included to 
illustrate that the curriculum field consists of a dfversity 
of conceptions and approaches. Unresolved problems that 
exacerbate conflict in the field are reviewed. 
The second section, "Dilemma and Reconciliation," sho,..rs 
that there was a clear split in the behavioral and humanistic 
approaches that is now emerging into a new synthesis. 
Literature closely related to this synthesis will also be 
included. 
It should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this 
present essay to review the complete history of the 
curriculum field and all of the possible contemporary 
conceptions of curriculum. Similarly, all of the possible 
historical antecedents of the behavioral-humanist dilemma 
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will not be examined. It will show that the curriculum field 
is a rich mosaic that is sometimes confusing, and that a 
behavioral-humanist synthesis is being addressed in the 
literature. 
Curriculum Conflict 
This section reviews works that focus on the definition 
and history of curriculum, the diversity of curricular 
approaches, some significant issues, and some unresolved 
problems. Although the literature described is not intended 
to be a comprehensive account of the curriculum field to 
date, it reflects the conflict that appears to exist. 
Cremin (1971) combined an historically reliable 
definition of curriculum with a conception of education that 
surpasses synonymy with "schooling" and then identified four 
perspectives that \'Tould immediately change. William Torey 
Harris's late nineteenth-centur,y definition of curriculum 
was summarized by Cremin "as the accumulated wisdom of the 
race to be made available to individuals through a variety 
of institutions in a variety of modes" (p. 208). He then 
connected this definition with a conception of education as 
"the effort to define that wisdom in the large and then 
assist individuals in the business of sharing it more compre-
hensively, more economically, more self-consciously, and 
more critically" (p. 218). This approach would result in the 
change of perspective in four areas. First, the relationship 
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of teaching and learning in one institution with teaching and 
learning in another would need to be questioned. Second, the 
educative process would have to be conceptualized as 
radically individualized. Third, the diversity of curricula 
being defined and taught by a variety of groups would be 
acknowledged, and these groups would be subject to some form 
of public responsibility. Fourth, the interrelationships of 
curricula within a pluralistic societal context should be 
investigated in terms of definition, scope and variety. 
Molnar and Zahorik (1977) presented a succinct account 
of the milestones in contemporary curriculum theorizing, as 
they see it. They traced the historical development of the 
curriculum field and identified several significant trends. 
-Additionally, they commented on the present state of 
curriculum theorizing and made predictions as to future 
directions. 
The authors specified that Franklin Bobbitt was the 
founder of curriculum as a specialized field at approximately 
1918. His formulation of curriculum was intertwined with the 
industrial growth, increased immigration, rapid industri-
alization, and technological development that characterized 
post-World War I America. Bobbitt is said to be influenced 
by principles of 11 scientific" management in vogue during 
that period in the business and industrial communities, and 
his curricular approach was characterized by an attempt to 
adapt these principles to education. 
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Scientific management principles applied to education 
meant that the student was to be treated as raw material 
to be processed and transformed into a product. If 
schools were to become as efficient and effective as 
factories, waste in the curriculum needed to be 
eliminated. Just as jobs were analyzed in industry to 
discover their essential features, various life activi-
ties were analyzed so that they could be taught more 
efficiently in schools. This process resulted in the 
identification of numerous discrete skills and other 
learnings, and the emergence of specific, detailed 
objectives as the first and most important decision in 
curriculum development. (p. 2) 
Bobbitt's ideas were carried on by Ralph Tyler in the 
1930's who developed a curriculum planning model "the power 
and impact" of \'Thich "cannot be overstated," according to 
these authors. They have characterized it as an "ends-means 
model" with decisions about objectives being made prior to 
the decisions about means. One limitation of this model, 
' the authors noted, is that it tends to perpetuate the status 
quo by not allowing for substantive changes. The authors 
charged that the model pioneered by Bobbitt and later Tyler 
has been extended by modern theorists including Taba, 
Goodland, Gagne, Glaser, and Popham and its substance has 
not been appreciably altered. They commented that "although 
over 50 years have passed since the emergence of the field 
of curriculum, Bobbitt could not quarrel with the direction 
curriculum development and theory have taken. His original 
view remains dominant today" (p. 4). 
The authors pointed out that others, such as Dewey, had 
some small influence on curricular thinking. The notion that 
ends and means were integrated and dialectically related 
never seriously challenged the Tylerian linear-sequential 
model in its impact in practice. 
27 
The authors stated their opinion that 11 scientism11 has 
remained the predominant approach to curriculum work, 
especially in the area of curriculum planning. This 
conceptual schema is being subjected to increasing criticism, 
and new approaches to curriculum thinking are emerging. They 
cited James Macdonald's "helpful scheme for understanding the 
recent state of curriculum theorizing" which classifies 
curriculum theories into three interests or types: 
(1) control, (2) hermeneutic, and (3) critical. 11 Control 
theories" have dominated curriculum thinking since the 
beginning. (Macdonald's scheme is detailed elsewhere in 
' 
this paper.) The curriculum field is presently more diverse 
than ever before; a greater variety of substantive domains 
and curriculum interests exist today, and alternatives to 
control and rational decision-making curriculum models are 
numerous. 
The authors indicated that the future of curriculum 
theorizing will see increased diversity and that divisions 
among curriculum positions will sharpen. They predicted 
that 11 the need for critical theory thet treats perspective 
and practice dialectically will become more apparent" (p. 7), 
asserting that curriculum theorists will no longer 
reflexively react to the assumptions of control theory, but 
strike out in different directions. 
Macdonald (1975) offered a framework within which 
curriculum theories may be conceptualized as one of three 
types: control, hermeneutic, or critical. 
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Control theories are described as a means through which 
"control interests" are translated into curriculum theories 
with a resulting acceptance of "instrumental reason or 
technological rationality as the modus operandi for 
approaching curriculum" (p. 1). These theories are intended 
to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of education 
and provide a "scientifically rational conceptualization of 
the relevant phenomena from which purposive rational, i.e., 
technical, actions may be generated" (p. 1). Macdonald 
identified Tyler's approach to curriculum, which is reviewed 
elsewhere in this paper, as the "exemplar" of control 
theories. He commented that the Tyler model may be 
operating in dual cycles: one at the curriculum level and 
the other at the instructional level, and pointed out 
criticisms of control theories: 
Control is only one human interest and is not appropriate 
when taken in the form of a type of rationality and 
methodology developed in the sciences in relation to 
non-human objects and applied to human beings. Both 
scientific and technical approach mistake their efforts 
as being "value free" and thus cover up a fundamental 
aspect of curriculum and instruction, the definition and 
selection of values translated into goals. The control 
theories are embedded in a social structure in \~hich they 
can only operate to facilitate a status quo which may 
well reduce our understanding of the human condition and 
facilitate the restriction of human freedom and the 
development of human potential. (p. 3) 
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The second type of theories, labeled "hermeneutic" by 
Macdonald, are characterized as "attempts to intentionally 
broaden our understanding through reinterpretation" (p. 3). 
Macdonald contrasted the methodology of the hermeneutic with 
that of the control approach: 
Whereas the scientific approach calls for takinga 
rational grid and procedure from one set of phenomena · 
and placing them over another (with variable adjustment), 
the hermeneutic methodology reflects a constant creative 
search for conceptual frameworks that will reveal through 
new interpretations a different perspective on the 
conditions we are concerned about. (p. 3) 
Thus, hermeneutic theory is concerned with perspective rather 
than practice and may concern itself with such elemen·ts as 
curricular lar1guage systems, relationships, consciousness, 
and praxis. Hermeneutic theory takes an "ob,jective",stance, 
but is deficient in practice. Macdonald noted that "its 
praxis seems not to impact the material and communal world" 
(p. 4). 
Critical theory, the third type in Nacdonald's scheme, 
"is an attempt to address both control and understanding, 
the sciences and humanities in a self reflective manner" (p. 
4). Critical theory is concerned with both perspective and 
practice; however, its value orientation is toward human 
11 emancipation" and its methodology is a "critical" 
reflection "only possible in the inter-relations of theory 
and praxis" (p. 4). Macdonald explained that: 
A curriculum theory, as a critical theory would be 
prediceted upon examining the basic propositions of 
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curriculum as socially and historically located social 
conventions. Further it would examine in detail the 
constraints placed upon the curriculum by the forming of 
social relations, rewards, and learning expectations in 
curriculum by economic and occupational interest 
structures, social class and power structure, and the. 
use of language as distorted by work and power arrange-
ments, as well as the form of the language itself. (p. 5) 
Critical theory, then, moves curriculum theorizing toward a 
broader perspective. 
Eisner and Vallance (19?4) developed five "general 
orientations" to curriculum, saying that "writers on 
curriculum and makers of curriculum employ beliefs or values 
that are characterized by one or more of these five orien-
tations" (p. 193). The categories are: "curriculum as the 
development of cognitive processes"; "curriculum as 
technology"; "self-actualization, or curriculum as 
consummatory experience"; "curriculum as social 
reconstruction-relevance," and "curriculum as academic 
rationalism." 
"Curriculum as the development of cognitive processes11 
(p. 5) is described as focusing on the development of 
intellectual processes and cognitive skills. It is a process-
oriented approach that emphasizes content-independent 
cognitive skills and the understanding of the dynamics of 
learning. Perceptual processes and the learner as an 
interactive and adaptive part of an open-ended growth-
oriented system are central concerns of this orientation to 
curriculum. 
"Curriculum as technology" (p. 7) conceptualizes the 
function of curriculum as developing efficient means to 
facilitate learning for predetermined ends. This approach 
is characterized by a process rather than a content 
orientation, and it rests on "stable" assumptions about the 
nature of learning. The assumptions include the views that 
learning can be seen as systematic, predictable, and 
controllable. 
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"Self-actualization, or the curriculum as consummatory 
experience" (p. 9) is a "value-saturated" approach which 
emphasizes purpose and integration on a personal level. The 
purpose of the curriculum is seen as providing self-
actualizing or consummatory educational experiences for each 
' learner. It is both content and process oriented, with a 
focus on the value assumptions underlying the content that 
is taught and with a process that emphasizes personal growth 
and liberation. 
The "social reconstruction-relevance" orientation to 
curriculum focuses on the :r·ole of education within a 
societal context. There is an emphasis on social reform and 
future directions of society, and the schools are often seen 
as instruments for or against change. Eisner and Vallance 
pointed out that a basic assumption of this orientation is 
that the individual educational development and the larger 
social context are interdependent. This orientation includes 
those who advocate "technological adaptation" in education as 
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well as those who demand that schools actively serve as tools 
for social change. 
The fifth orientation to curriculum, "academic 
rationalism," is described as the most "tradition-bound" of 
all, emphasizing the acquisition of great ideas and access to 
significant cultural products. Education is conceptualized 
as the transmission of classical culture in order to develop 
the individual learner's intelligence and sharpen his or her 
thought. The focus of the curriculum in this orientation is 
on the traditional disciplines, and the "practical" is often 
ignored, according to the authors. 
Eisner and Vallance went on to comment that fallacies 
about formalism, content, and universalism are related to 
' curriculum orientations. Briefly, it was the authors' 
opinion that neither process nor content should be considered 
paramount in approaches to curriculum and that no content 
area is universally importe.nt. 
The five orientations th~t the authors presented do not 
directly reflect either a behavioral or humanistic viewpoint 
although it could be argued that each contains elements of 
one or the other, or both, to a greater or lesser extent. 
The authors stated that curriculum can be conceptualized in 
terms of psychological models, and stated their rationale 
for avoiding this approach: 
Psychological models also differentiate between 
conceptualizations of schooling. Such differences can 
often be reduced to a disagreement as to the model of 
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learning presumed by each since any conceptualization of 
education reflects some assumptions as to how children 
learn--ranging from behavioral S-R models at one extreme 
to humanist or existential models at the other. But to 
specify a psychological continuum would be hazardous 
since psychology itself is at least as multidimensional 
as education and, furthermore, it is difficult to obtain 
agreement on the terminology. For these reasons we have 
chosen not to differentiate explicitly the writings in 
curriculum by the psychological models to which they 
implicitly refer. Nevertheless, it is clear that any 
comprehensive scheme of curriculum issues must be able 
to at least accommodate these differences; the orienta-
tions we hove formulated seem to make such accommodation 
possible. (p. 4) 
The articles reviewed demonstrate that curriculum can be 
conceptualized by differing classifications, definitions, and 
schemes. The purpose of this paper is to examine behavioral 
and humanistic approaches, what Eisner has termed "curriculum 
as technology" and "self-actut::~lization, or curriculum as 
consummatory experience," respectively. It may be most 
appropriate to view these two as psychological models, 
although f-'lacdonald 's inventive scheme can be a useful method 
for gaining perspective. Macdonald's favorite target appears 
to be the writings of Ralph Tyler. The following is a 
description of the "Tyler Rationale" "'i th some clarification 
of and reaction to his model. 
Ralph Tyler (1949) developed a rationale that has been 
described as the dominant curriculum model in the United 
States. The Tyler Rationale is a curriculum-planning 
framework which is or~anized around four questions which 
appear to be best described as an ends-means or linear-
sequential model. These are: 
1. What educational purposes should the school seek to 
attain? 
2. What educational experiences can be provided that 
are likely to attain these purposes? 
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3. Hovr can these educational experiences be effectively 
organized? 
4. How can we determine whether these purposes are 
being attained? (p. 1) 
An answer to the first question may be formulated by 
stating objectives. The sources for these objectives, 
according to Tyler, are studies of learners, studies of 
contemporary life outside the school setting, suggestions 
from subject specialists, the use of philosophy, and the use 
of a psychology of learning. He recommended that objectives 
should be stated in terms of changes to take place in 
students• behavior within the context of the content or area 
' of life in which this behavior is to operate. He concluded 
that 
It should be clear that a satisfactory formulation of 
objectives which indicates both the behavioral aspects 
and the content aspects provides clear specifications 
to indicate just what the educational job is. By 
defining those desired educational results as clearly 
as possible the curriculum-maker has the most useful 
set of criteria for selecting content, for suggesting 
learning activities, for deciding on the kind of 
teaching procedures to follow, in fact to carry on all 
the further steps of curriculum planning. We are 
devoting much time to the setting up and formulation 
of objectives because they are the most critical 
criteria for guiding all the other activities of the 
curriculum maker. (p. 62) 
Tyler then discussed the second question and defined 
"learning experience" as "the interaction between the learner 
and the external conditions in the environment to which he 
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can react" (p. 63). He weni; on to state that learning takes 
place through the act::lve behavior of the student and that 
the teacher's role is 11 the manipulation of the environment 
in such a way as to set up stimulating situations" (p. 64) 
that will elicit the desired behavior. The author suggested 
five general principles in selecting learning experiences: 
the student must have experiences that afford opportunity to 
practice the behavior implied by the objective; such behavior 
should be satisfying to the student; these experiences must 
be within the range of possibility; many experiences can be 
employed to attain the same objective; and the same learning 
experience will usually result in several outcomes. He 
pointed out that learning experiences include the development 
' 
of thinking skills, acquiring information, developing social 
attitudes, and developing interests. 
Tyler then addressed the third element of his model by 
arguing for the necessity of "organization." His view of 
learning is that it is cumulative and therefore "learning 
experiences must be put together to form some kind of 
coherent program" (p. 83) which necessitates the organization 
of learning experiences into units, courses, and programs. 
He wrote that there are three major criteria for effective 
curricular organization: c~ntinuity, sequence, and 
integration. "Continuity refers to the vertical reiteration 
of major curriculum elements" (p. 84), and sequence 
"emphasizes the importance of having each successive 
experience build upon the preceding one but to go more 
broadly and deeply into matters involved" (p. 85) than 
continuity. "Integration," according to Tyler, "refers to 
the horizontal relationship of curriculum experiences" (p. 
85). The horizontal relationship should serve to unify the 
learning experiences. It is important in this model to 
identify the elements which serve as "organizing threads 11 
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in a particular curricular design. These elements include 
basic concepts, values, and skills. Tyler went on to discuss 
some common organizing principles in the curriculum and cited 
chronological organization as an example. He pointed out 
that this type of organization may be appropriate for the 
study of history, but not for other areas. 
other organizing principles include 
He wrote that .. 
increasing breadth of application, increasing range of 
activities included, the use of description followed 
by analysis, the development of specific illustrations 
followed by broader and broader principles to explain 
these illustrations, and the attempt to build an 
increasingly unified world picture from specific parts 
which are first built into larger and larger wholes. 
Since there are so many possible organizing principles, 
it is important that in working upon any particular 
curriculum possible principles of organization are 
examined and decisions made tentatively to be checked 
by actual tryout of the material to see ho\'r far these 
principles prove satisfactory in developing continuity, 
sequence, and integration. (p. 98) 
Tyler added that there must be an 11 organizing structure" for 
the learning experiences and that structural elements exist 
at several levels. At the lo'IJlest level are found lessons,. 
topics, and units which are organized at the intermediate 
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level into courses. Courses are organized on a higher level 
by subjects, broad fields, core curricula, and fourth 
structure, which Tyler described as "a completely undiffer-
entiated structure in which the total program is treated as 
a unit" (p. 98). He suggested that the process of planning a 
unit of organization involves agreement on the general scheme 
of organization, the general organizing principles to be 
followed, and the lm•rest unit to be employed. In addition, 
he suggested the development of flexible plans for teachers 
and using "pupil-teacher planning." 
Tyler asserted that the evaluation process, step four 
in his rationale, should be designed to determine how well 
the objectives in step one are being met. 
It is only after the objectives have identified, 
clearly defined, and situations listed which give 
opportunity for the expression of the behavior 
desired that it is possible to examine available 
evaluation instruments to see how far they may serve 
the evaluation purposes desired. (p. 113) 
He advocated the employment of paper-and-pencil tests, 
observation, and sampling procedures in evaluation, 
emphasizing the importance of pre- and posttesting and also 
recommending follow-up studies as appropriate evaluation 
elements. He stated that evalu~tion procedures should be 
objective, reliable, and valid and that such data would aid 
the teacher and the curriculum planners. He pointed out 
that planning is a continu~ process and evaluation aids in 
"replanning, redevelopment and then reappraisal" (p. 123) 
within the context of a continuing cycle. 
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Tyler has been accused of being rigid and prescriptive 
in his views, and it may be useful to cite several lines 
from his introduction to put his writing in perspective. He 
wrote about ~asic Principl~: 
It is not a manual for curriculum construction since 
it does not describe and outline in detail the steps 
to be taken by a given school or college that seeks to 
build a curriculum. This book outlines one way of 
viewing an instructional program as a functioning 
instrument of education. The student is encouraged to 
examine other rationales and to develop his own 
conception of the elements and relationships involved 
in an effective curriculum. (p. 1) 
There is a question as to whether Tyler can be labeled 
a "behaviorist, 11 as Iv1acdonald and others have so con:8idently 
assertedo The term "behavioral objectives" has been 
stipulated as part of the larger behavioral model for the 
purposes of this essay, So, by definition Tyler is a 
behaviorist. Support for this notion includes his deter-
ministic orientation, his emphasis on behavior, and the 
specification of behavioral objectives. His view of 
learning is that it is environmental and cumulative, and be 
sees the teacher's major task as that of manipulating 
environmental variables. His orientation to evaluation 
seems congruent with behavioral procedures, and he cites 
E. L. Thorndike for support of his approach. Additionally, 
a number of curriculum workers have labeled him a 
behaviorist probably because he represents behaviorism as 
they understand it. 
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On the other band, there is evidence against labeling 
Tyler a behaviorist, which includes the facts that be never 
did so himself, and, other than using the term "behavior" 
extensively, he does not employ the vocabulary of behavioral 
psychology at all. His "psychology of learning" makes no 
use of classical or operant conditioning or the concept of 
contingencieso It should be pointed out that Tyler was a 
contemporary of Watson and Skinner and that while behavioral 
psychology was not as highly developed then as now, it was 
certainly developed to the point that it could have been 
incorporated into Tyler's scheme if be had so desired. The 
most compelling argument against seeing Tyler as a behaviorist 
is that his model is an incomplete embodiment of the 
behavioral model. It may be more accurate to label him as 
an "empiricist" or a "quasi-behaviorist." 
Perhaps Tyler's connection with Thornd ilce is at the 
root of the problem that some contemporary curricnlists have 
with the behavioral approach in general. In an article that 
stridently urges curriculum workers to avoid the "seamy" 
(p. 309) heritage of behaviorism (Franklin, 1976), some of 
Thorndike's shortcomings are pointed out. This author 
presented persuasive evidence that Thorndike held a narrow 
and specific view of learning, advocated the use of psychology 
for social control, saw "objectivity" as an ultimate good, 
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and was racist and elitist in his social views. All of this 
may be true, but Franklin's warning to avoid resurrecting 
"Thorndike's psychology as a foundation for contemporary 
curriculum discourse" missed the point, which is that 
Thorndike's work is not identical to that of Skinner, Malott, 
Staats, Bandura, or a number of other recent conceptions of 
the behavioral approach. It would have been more appropriate 
for Franklin to refute Skinner's conceptions, rather than to 
imply that all contemporary behaviorists are identical to 
Thorndike. This article did, however, demonstrate that· 
misconceptions can result from a broad labeling process that 
characterizes all "behaviors" as representing the identical 
conceptual approach. 
' 
On the subject of "learning," Kiester (1978) listed the 
areas of agreement and disagreement between Ralph Tyler and 
B. F. Skinner. The results of an interview with Tyler reveal 
that 
He agrees ,.,i th Skinner that learning must come in small 
steps, must be immediately reinforced, that a feedback 
mechanism must be established, and that there must be the 
opportunity to transfer the learning to another situation. 
Unlike Skinner, however, he believes that human beings 
need to know why they're learning if they are to learn 
effectively. "Pigeons can respond to rewards and punish-
ment without knowing what they're trying to do," he says, 
"but humans must know where they're going. They must 
have a cognitive view. It's hard to tell what the 
cognitive view of a pigeon is." (p. 34) 
A similar thought was presented by Bakan (1965), who 
humorously commented on the choice of domesticated lower 
animals as the subjects-of-choice in research. He wrote 
that "The muteness of animals insures that they will not 
complicate the situation '\'Ti th reports on their thoughts or 
feelings or wishes" (p. 188). 
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English, Winters, Lewis, Huebner, Tanner and Macdonald 
(1980) contributed concise responses to the question "Is the 
Tyler Rationale a suitable base for current curriculum 
development?" Four of the responses were affirmative, and 
two opposed the contention that the Tyler Rationale is, in 
fact, suitable for current curriculum development needs. 
On the affirmative side, English asserted that the 
Tyler Rationale "works" because it aids practicing .school 
personnel "who must be responsive to minimum competencies, 
statewide testing mandates, efforts by the states and the 
• 
feds to apply standards of ouality, taxpayer resistance, and 
public scrutiny." \'linters supported the continued employment 
of the Tyler Rationale as, in her opinion, it provides the 
planners and writers of the curriculum with "specific 
guidelines," and Tanner claimed that the critics of this 
position have failed to develop sui table alternatives. Le\oJis 
is a fan of the Tyler Rationale because it is "systematic," 
but advocates the employment of findings from the social 
sciences to develop decision-making techniques. These 
responses supporting the continued use of the Tyler 
Rationale lend credence to the vie'\'! that it is, in essence, 
a bureaucratic convenience which benefits administrators 
rather than students and teachers. 
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Huebner takes the position that the Tyler Rationale's 
usefulness has expired. Huebner pointed out that the Tyler 
Rationale served a unifying purpose during the 40's and 50's 
and permitted "greater centralization and necessary control 
over curriculum development." He stated that the major 
problem with this ap?roach is that it does not provide a 
suitable curriculum forum for grounding the questions of 
value in education. 
We have two questions of value, and one of technology. 
How are we, as adults, to live with and respond to the 
young and those not yet educated? What intellectual, 
technical, and social resources are to be given to the 
young? How can educators bring together the world's 
wealth and the young so both are valued? (p. 5) 
Huebner did commit the mistake of criticizing the Tyler 
" 
Rationale because of its "behavioral" nature. The inaccuracy 
of identifying Tyler's position with a behavioral approach, 
this is, conditioning models, is apparent to anyone familiar 
\'Tith both the former and the latter. Huebner would be on 
firmer ground to criticize Tyler for not being behavioral, 
in the conditioning sense, and pointing out the ignorance of 
this model's proponents who think that it is. 
Macdonald added his dissent by pointing out that the 
Tyler model does not represent'the complex realities of the 
nonlinear curriculum development processes which embody a 
multiplicity of interacting factors. He pointed out that 
curriculum has been reduced to a so-called "technical" 
process that is "devoid of concern for the fundamental moral, 
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ethical, political, and aes·bbetic aspects of curriculum." He 
added that "curriculum is as much or more who makes the 
decisions, and what the personal and subjective points of 
view of the participants are." 
Skinner (1968) identified the contingencies of 
reinforcement under which learning occurs as: "(1) an 
occasion upon which behavior occurs, (2) the behavior itself, 
and (3) the consequence of the behavior" (p. 4), and that 
teaching is the "arrangement of contingencies of reinforce-
ment" (p. 5). He stated tho?t teaching and learning 
traditionally have been explained as the result of doing, 
or experience, or trial and error; and that if these three 
notions are combined they represent the concept of contin-
• 
gencies of reinforcement as they apply to education. 
The author stated th~t behaviorists have identified 
principles that allow learning to be conceptualized as a 
science; however, usual classroom practice is a "great 
shock" to him (p. 14) because of the pervasiveness of 
aversive control, failure to design effective contingencies, 
the lack of frequent reinforcement, and skillfully developed 
programso He pointed out that both teachers and pupils are 
unhappy with usual classroom practice and called for the 
improvement of teaching based on the science of behavior. 
Skinner stated that a variety of mechanical, electrical, 
electronic, audio, and visual devices can be employed to 
improve teaching and education. He described one machine 
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used to teach mathematics: 
The important features of the device are these: 
reinforcement for the right answer is immediate. The 
mere manipulation of the device will probably be 
reinforcing enough to keep the average pupil at work 
for a suitable period each day, provided traces of 
earlier aversive control can be wiped out. A teacher 
may supervise· an entire class at work on such devices 
at the same time, yet each child may progress at his 
own rate, completing as many problems as possible 
within the class period. If forced to be away from 
school, he may return to pick up where he left off. 
The gifted child will advance rapidly, but can be kept 
from getting too far ahead either by being excused from 
arithmetic for a time or by being given special sets of 
problems which take him into some of the interesting 
bypaths of mathematics. 
The device makes it possible to present carefully 
designed material in which one problem can depend upon 
the ans1..,rer to the preceding problem and where, therefore, 
the most efficient progress to an eventually complex 
repertoire can be made. Provision has been made for 
recording the commonest mistakes so that the tapes can 
be modified as experience dictates. Additional steps 
can be inserted '\'I here pupils tend to have trouble, and 
ultimately the material will reach a point at which the 
answers of the average child will almost always be right. 
If the material itself proves not to be sufficiently 
reinforcing, other reinforcers in the possession of the 
teacher or school may be made contingent upon the 
operation of the device or upon progress through a 
series of problems. Supplemental reinforcement would 
not sacrifice the advantages gained from immediate 
reinforcement and from the possibility of constructing 
an optimal series of steps which approach the complex 
repertoire of mathematical behavior most efficiently. 
(p. 25) 
Skinner pointed out that effective teaching machines 
have several important features. 
The student must compose his response rather than 
select it from a set of alternatives, as in a multiple-
choice self-rater. One reason for this is that \tre want 
him to recall rather than recognize--to make a response 
as well as see that it is right. Another reason is that 
effective multiple-choice material must contain 
plausible wrong responses, which are out of place in 
the delicate process of 11 shaping 11 behavior because they 
strengthen unwanted forms. Although it is much easier 
to build a machine to score multiple-choice answers 
than to evaluate a composed response, the technical 
advantage is outweighed by these and other 
considerations. 
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A second requirement of a minimal teaching machine also 
distinguishes it from earlier versions. In acquiring 
complex behavior the student must pass through a care-
fully designed sequence of steps, often of considerable 
length. Each step must be so small that it can always 
be taken, yet in taking it the student moves somewhat 
closer to somewhat competent behavior. The machine 
must make sure that these steps are taken in a carefully 
prescribed order. (p. 35) 
Skinner argued that "the success of such a machine 
depends upon the material used in it" (p. 39) and that the 
design of programmed materials is no easy task. He 
illustrated the difficulty of designing effective programs .. 
by presenting several examples, commenting that 
Whether good programming is to remain an art or to 
become a scientific technology, it is reassuring to 
know that there is a final authority--the student. An 
unexpected advantage of machine instruction has proved 
to be the feedback to the programmer. (p. 49) 
Skinner confronted the concerns of those who fear that 
teaching machines will replace teachers, and attempted to 
clarify the machine-teacher relationship. 
\'Jill machines replace teachers? On the contrary, they 
are capital equipment to be used by teachers to save 
time and labor. In assigning certain mechanizable 
functions to machines 1 the teacher emerges in his proper role as an ind~spensable human being. He may 
teach more students than heretofore--this is probably 
inevitable if the worldwide demand for education is to 
be satisfied--but he will do so in fewer hours and with 
fewer burdensome chores. In return for his greater 
productivity he can ask society to improve his economic 
condition. (p. 55) 
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He stated that education and Western society as a whole 
are moving away from aversive practices and that "a school 
system must be called a failure if it cannot induce students 
to learn except by threatening them for not learning'' (p. 
57). This form of education is incongruent with the values 
of democratic societies, and teaching machines are one means 
by which inefficient and harmful educational practices can 
be ended, according to the author. 
Skinner commented that behavioral principles, and 
teaching machines designed from those principles, hRve the 
potential for being applied positively to education in 
addition to the possibility'of being misused. 
It could well be that a technology of teaching will be 
unwisely used. It could destroy initiative and 
creativity~ it could make men all alike (and not 
necessarily in being equally excellent); it could 
suppress the beneficial effect of accidents on the 
development of the individual and the evolution of a 
culture. On the other hand, it could maximize the 
genetic endowment of each student; it could make him 
as skillful, competent, and informed as possible; it 
could build the greatest diversity of interests; it 
could lead him to make the greatest possible contribution 
to the survival and development of his culture. (p. 91) 
Skinner addressed the issue of why, in his opinion, 
teachers fail. He stated that analyses of learning processes 
and teaching methods are extraordinarily neglected, and 
requests or demands for additional money are the usual 
approaches to the improvement of education. He stated that 
the argument is that 
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We should build more and better schools. We should 
recruit more and better teachers. We should search for 
better students and make sure that all competent students 
can go to school or college. We should multiply teacher-
student contacts with films and television. We should 
design new curricula. All this can be done without 
looking at teaching itself. We need not ask how those 
better teachers are to teach those better students in 
those better schools, what kinds of contact are to be 
multiplied through mass mediat or how new curricula are 
to be made effective. (p. 93; 
Skinner pointed out that the new teacher rarely has any 
training in teaching, but rather teaches as he or she has 
been taught. This usually includes strong elements of 
aversive control, a technique which Skinner finds counter-
productive as it leads to escape, counterattack, inaction, 
' and emotional accompaniments as responses from students. He 
pointed out that it is not difficult to explain the use of 
aversive control. 
Systems which are basically aversive have produced well-
disciplined, obedient, industrious, and eventually 
informed and skilled students sometimes to the envy of 
teachers who cannot skillfully use the same techniques. 
Even the students themselves may be impressed and may 
return years later to thank their teachers for having 
beaten or ridiculed them. (p. 101) 
He claimed that a less coercive pattern in education is 
necessary to induce students to learn and that the most 
important element missing in classrooms is positive 
reinforcement. He went on to say that 
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teaching may be defined as an arrangement of contin-
gencies of reinforcement under which behavior changes. 
Relevant contingencies can be most successfully analyzed 
in studying the behavior of one student at a time under 
carefully controlled conditions. (p. 113) 
Skinner also recommended that "the behavior of the 
establishment" (p. 227) be analyzed in terms of behavioral 
principles. Administrators, teachers, educational 
researchers, policy makers, and those who support education 
are all subject to contingencies of reinforcement "which 
may need to be changed to improve education as an 
institution." 
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In a later work (Skinner, 1971), the author emphasized 
We need to design contingencies under which students 
acquire behavior useful,to them and their culture--
contingencies that do not have troublesome by-products 
and that generate the behavior said to "show respect for 
learning." It is not difficult to see what is wrong in 
most educational environments, and much has already been 
done to design materials which make learning as easy as 
possible and to contingencies, in the classroom and 
elsewhere, which give students powerful reason for 
getting an education. (p. 149) 
The following article represents an elemental 
behavioristic approach to curriculum. It is included to 
show that a "pure" behavioral model can be adapted to 
educational practice. 
Silverman (1974) described how the "S-R reinforcement 
model" can be applied to education. His focus is on 
adapting· the ·model to instructional planning, and he 
describes it as.consisting of 
a particular form of behavioral analysis in which 
behavior is represented in terms of the association 
between stimuli (S) and responses (R), and learning is 
represented in terms of the systematic changes in S-R 
associations that occur when reinforcements are 
appropriately correlated with responses. The term 
reinforcement refers to the events that strengthen 
responses. (p. 65) 
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This model leads to an analysis of instruction in terms of 
the fundamental learning factors of responses, reinforcements, 
and stimuli. The author stated that this model indicates 
three essentials for learnin~: 
(1) The learner must make the response which he is to 
learn. He learns what he does. (2) The responses must 
be strengthened. Learning progresses as the responses 
in question are reinforced and increase in probability~ 
(3) The responses should be put under the control of 
particular stimuli; these stimuli will set the occasion 
for the occurrence of the responses. (p. 65) 
Silverman then listed ~uestions which should be asked in 
the planning of instruction based on the S-R reinforcement 
model. These questions were organized under three 
categories: responses, reinforcement, and stimuli. 
In the area of responses, the author's first question 
was "Vlhat are the responses to be learned?" (p. 66). 
Silverman's reply was that effective teaching is based on the 
identification of responses to be reinforced and that this 
model focuses on overt behavior. He acknowledged, however, 
that much learning activity may be covert in nature. The 
second is: "Are the responses to be learned already in the 
learner's repertoire of responses, or are they novel and 
unfamiliar responses?" (p. 66). This question was intended 
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to clarify the learner's relationship to the subject matter 
in terms of his or her learning history. Fourth, Silverman 
asked, "What responses might compete "'rith the responses to 
be learned?" (p. 67). This aspect of responses must be 
examined, according to the author, because competing 
responses may retard learning. The author's fifth and final 
question relating to responses was: "What can be done to 
reduce the probability of competing responses?" (p. 67). He 
responded that "selective reinforcement" and "extinction11 
are most effective in this area and cautioned against the· 
use of "punishment": 
If punishment is to be an effective suppressor, it must 
be strong. Ho\'rever, strong punishment introduces 
undesirable factors into a learning situation, often 
making the situation aversive by evoking emotional 
responses that may in turn provide another source of 
competing responses. (p. 68) 
In the area of reinforcement Silverman listed two 
questions, the first of which is: 11 What reinforcers will 
effectively strengthen the responses to be learned? 11 (p. 68). 
He then pointed out that reinforcers vary along individual 
and situational dimensions, and that what is reinforcing to 
any particular individual in any particular situation must 
be determined by "systematic observation." The second 
question was: "How can reinforcers be most effectively 
used?" (p. 68). He stated that reinforcement must be 
immediate, that the learner's deprivation or satiation in 
regard to a reinforcer must be taken into account, and that 
"intermittent" reinforcement is often most effective. 
Silverman noted three questions to be asked in regard 
to "stimuli." First, "'.vhat stimuli are to control the 
responses?" (p. 69).. Clarifying this question involved 
identifying stimuli and responses correctly and focusing on 
making the stimuli comprehensible to the learner. Second, 
"Ho~T should stimuli be associated with responses?" (p. 69). 
The author stated that according to this model, a stimulus 
and a response should be paired in the presence of a 
reinforcer to achieve this association. 
Silverman dealt \'Tith the concept of "motivation" by 
stating that a highly motivated student is one "for ,.,hom a 
particular reinforcer or a variety of reinforcers is 
effective" (p. 71). Conversely, a poorly motivated student 
is one for whom few if any ~einforcers are effective. 
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Additionally, the author com~ented on this model's 
relationship to "retention" and the "transfer" of learning, 
stating that retention is increased by usin~ intermittent 
schedules of reinforcement and by increasing the number and 
variety of stimuli associated with a particular response. 
Also, "retention is helped by seeing to it that no new 
responses are associated ·with the relevant stimuli between 
the time of learning and the time of retention testing" (p. 
77). The transfer of learning, he said, is influenced by 
the similarity between the learnin~ task and the task to 
which the transfer is being made. 
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Silverman concluded the presentation of this model \'lith 
the assertion that 
An analysis of a teaching problem in terms of the S-R 
reinforcement model does not lead directly to the use 
of specific instructional techniques, nor does such an 
analysis necessarily suggest devices or specialized 
training aids. Techniques, aids, and devices are 
developed in terms of the questions raised by the 
language and model of analysis of the model. (p. 78) 
Hmrever, he added that since this model implies a one-to-one 
teacher and student relationship, the use of technological 
devices may be desirable. 
Two articles illustrated the humanistic approach to 
curriculum. Purpel and Belander (1972) presented rationale, 
and Bridges (1978) described and criticized humanistic 
education. 
.. 
Purpel and Belanger (1972) sketched a framework for a 
humanistically oriented curriculum by stating the values and 
beliefs that they see as important undergirdinGs for such a 
model. They asserted that the value base of a humanistic 
curriculum model should include greater emphasis on self-
fulfillment, self-renewal, personal liberty, self-awareness, 
self-learning, and social justice with freedom for 
fulfillment for all. In addition, the authors value "greater 
commitment to the active pursuit of fundamental social change 
in a moral and rational context," and "a profound commitment 
to a society that celebrates not merely tolerates diversity 
and pluralism" (p. 73). The authors believed that more 
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personal, emotive, and intuitive forms of knm.,ledge should be 
encouraged and that "it is imperative that human needs be the 
central criteria in the process of inquiry" (p. 73). 
Bridges (1978) criticized humanistic education from 
three perspectives: classroom milieu, the learner as a 
person, and the subject matter. 
Classroom milieu is characterized by an individual and 
personal freedom to learn, a focus on "unstructured" learning 
situations, and the teacher as a facilitator or resource 
person. The personal freedom to learn is based on the concept 
that significant learning begins with the learner's need to 
know and subsequent self-initiated learning activities, 
rather than external rewards and punishments. Bridges stated 
that this natural process "'i>y which we learned what we wanted 
to know is a model for this.aspect of humanistic education" 
(p. 72). However, the presumption that the learner is aware 
of his or her own needs is not always valid, and humanistic 
education has not adequately dealt with those learners who 
have a legitimate need for structure. He stated that ''much 
of the difficulty with the conduct of an unstructured class-
room or course comes from an incomplete embodiment of the 
model on which it is based" (p. 73). That is, in the natural 
environment, this model combines a context of choice which is 
unstructured with resources or means which may be highly 
structured. The author stated that 
If we are going to adapt this significant learning model 
to institutional education, we must be clear that it is 
within the institution (rather than within the particular 
classroom) that freedom from structure is needed, so that 
people can gain access to whatever resources their needs 
demand. These resources, once again, will tend to be 
structured--though they will certainly not consist mainly 
of "courses" on traditional subjects. (p. 73) 
He went on to say that the classroom milieu should also be 
oriented toward students who are not aware of their needs or 
what they want to know. He sees one important contribution 
of humanistic education as helping persons discover their own 
deepest needs-to-know so that the institution can then 
provide ready access to appropriate resources. 
From the perspective of the "learner as a \'thole person," 
Bridges affirmed the value of awareness or sensitivity 
exercises that allow students "to locate themselves 'lt!ithin 
" 
the interpersonal matrix of a class•• (p. 74) as long as the 
need for them emerges from the situation itself rather than 
a desire to engage in technique as an end in itself. The 
author pointed out that these exercises employed inappropri-
ately and mechanistically violate the spirit of humanistic 
education and may be unnecessary when the "whole person" is 
obviously present. 
Humanistic educators often overlook this fact and launch 
enthusiastically into some cunning tactic to combat non-
existent disinterest. Perhaps you have gone to 11 An 
Evening with X," one of those chances to hear a leading 
humanist tell you what is on his mind these days. You 
have come for just that--to hear what he is thinking--
and he sterts you off with warm-ups to meet one another 
and try to get you really present. Then, remembering to 
be really unstructured, he asks you what you want to-hear 
(Hell, you came to hear him, right?) and sa;)rs pious 
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things about how no one can really teach anyone anything. 
Pretty soon the man you came to hear is playing the 
neutral role of facilitator in a lot of audience 
interaction. (p. ?5 fn) 
Ironically, the use of such an approach inappropriately may 
foster authoritarianism and subvert the goal of reaching and 
involving the "whole person." However, Bridges did 
emphasize the importance of fostering the relationship between 
the learner as a person and the subject matter as a major 
element of the humanistic approach to education. 
In his critique of the third perspective, the subject 
matter, Bridges repo~ that some humanistic educators argue 
that subject matter is not relevant. 
The point of education (so runs this argument) is 
deepened sensitivity, heightened awareness and enhanced 
self-expressiveness. It' th~t is the case, then \<Thatever 
we are purporting to teach is only a vehicle toward these 
goals. But then, one discovers history and biology and 
economics are mighty cumbersome vehicles compared to some 
kind of quasi-therapeutic group experience. (p. ?6) 
Bridges asserted that this is a fallacy and that such an 
approach would justify the criticism that humanistic education 
focuses on nothing but its own process. He stated that this 
is not a tenet of humanistic education and that process is 
important in relation to subject matter. Process, in proper 
perspective, will be seen as supplemental and as articulating 
the relationship between the learner's own experiencing and 
the subject matter in order to transform the subject matter. 
That is, "when a person's need is allowed to shape the 
substance, then any subject matter is transformed" (p. 78). 
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Bridges characterized much of the traditional approach to 
subject matter as impersonal, deterministic, and mechanical. 
He advocated an approach which fosters personal involvement, 
creativity, and "choicefulness" as central to the learner's 
relationship to the subject matter. A humanistic approach, 
he stated, has the potential to accomplish this. 
He summed up his critique by offering some implications 
of the humanistic approach for teachers: 
Where does all this leave an actual teacher in this land 
at this moment of time? In most cases it leaves him in a 
bad "'ray, for it leaves him trying to do in his classroom 
what the institution as a whole ought to be doing. It 
forces him to be a resource clearing house for those 
whose aims are clear and a setting for self-exploration 
for those whose aims are undefined. It forces him to 
convert whatever he has to offer to both groups into 
course units of a predetermined weight and length. Yet 
these matters that we have been discussing may clarify 
that teacher's situation as "'re 11, and may remove some of 
the false dilemmas that complicate it unnecessarily. 
They may do so by distinguishing between structures that 
should be abandoned because they are a substitute for 
personal choice and those that should be developed because 
they serve a goal-related purpose. They may do so by 
distinguishing between the ends and the means of affective 
education and by exploring the relation of subject matter 
to personally significant learning. And finally, they 
may do so by shovring that behind the multiple faces of 
this entity is something solid and coherent. (p. 78) 
Cerl Rogers (1969), a leading proponent of the appli-
cation of humanistic psychology to education, has written 
about the importance of the interpersonal relationship in 
learning. He stated that "teaching is a vastly overrated 
function" (p. 103) and that the traditional description of 
the teacher's role is grounded in three faulty assumptions. 
57 
First, the assumption that the teacher is to impart knowledge 
or skills in addition to showing, guiding, and directing the 
student is faulty because it is more efficient to use a book 
or programmed instruction. Second, the author stated that no 
one can legitimately decide, from "a superior vantage point" 
(p. 103), what someone else r.eeds to know. In addition, he 
stated that the '1assumption that what is taught is learned; 
what is presented is what is assimilated" is "obviously 
untrue" (p. 104) and invalidates the popular notion of 
coverage. 
Rog~rs asserted that teaching and the imparting of know-
ledge or skills made sense in an unchanging environment, but 
that modern man lives in an environment which is continually 
changing. Therefore, the gbal of education should be the 
facilitation of change and learning. 
The only man who is educated is the m~n who has learned 
how to learn; the man 'ttlho has learned hm., to adapt and 
change; the man who has realized that no knowledge is 
secure, that only the process of seeking knowledge gives 
a basis for security. Changiness, a reliance on process 
rather than upon static knowledge, is the only thing 
that makes any sense as a goal for education in the 
modern world. (p. 104) 
Rogers went on to describe how that goal can be achieved 
and how an educator can encourage "self-initiated, 
significant, experiential, 'gut-level' learning by the whole 
person." He wrote that 
the initiation of such learning rests not upon the 
teaching skills of the leader, not upon his scholarly 
knowledge of the field, not upon his curricular planning, 
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not upon the use of his audiovisual aids, not upon the 
programmed learning he utilizes, not upon his lectures 
and presentations, not upon an abundance of books, though 
each of these might at one time or another be utilized as 
an important resource. No, the facilitation of signifi-
cant learning rests upon certain at·titudinal qualities 
which exist in the personal relationship between the 
facilitator and the learner. (p. 106) 
The author described three sets of attitudes or qualities 
which facilitate learning. These attitudes are said to 
distinguish a "facilitator" from a traditional "teacher." 
First, and most basic, is the attitude of genuineness or 
realness on the part of the facilitator. 
vlhen the facilitator is a real person, being what he is, 
entering into a relations hip '"i th the learner without 
presenting a front or facade, he is much more likely to 
be effective. This means that the feelings which he is 
experiencing are available to him, available to his 
awareness, that he is able to live these feelings, be 
them, and able to communicate them if appropriate. It 
means that he comes into a direct personal encounter with 
the learner, meeting him on a person-to-person basis. It 
means that he is being himself, not denying himself. (p. 
106) 
The second essential attitude of the facilitator for 
effectiveness in the learnin~ process is that of prizing, 
acceptance, and trust. 
It is a caring for the learner, but a non-possessive 
caring. It is an acceptance of this other individual as 
a separate person, having worth in his own right. It is 
a basic trust--a belief that this other person is somehow 
fundamentally trustworthy. Whether we call it prizing, 
acceptance, trust, or by some other term, it shows up in 
a variety of observable ways. The facilitator who has a 
considerable degree of this attitude can be fully accep-
tant of the fear and hesitation of the student as he 
approaches a new problem as \<lell as acceptant of the 
pupil's satisfaction in achievement. Such a teacher can 
accept the student's occasional apathy, his erratic 
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desires to explore by-roads of kno\'rledge, as well as his 
disciplined efforts to achieve major goals. He can 
accept personal feelings which both disturb and promote 
learning--rivalry \-lith a sibling, hatred of authority, 
concern about personal adequacy. What we are describing 
is a prizing of the learner as an imperfect human being 
1t1ith many feelings, many potentialities. The facili-
tator's prizing or acceptance of the learner is an 
operational expression of his essential confidence and 
trust in the capacity of the human organism. (p. 109) 
The third element which establishes the kind of classroom 
climate that Rogers advocates is empathetic understanding or 
the ability to understand the student's reactions from the 
inside. The author stated that if the facilitator has an 
awareness of the way the process of learning seems to the 
student, the likelihood of significant learning is increased. 
This attitude of standing in the other's shoes, of 
viewing the world through the student's eyes, is almost 
unheard of in the class~oom. One could listen to 
thousands of ordinary classroom interactions i'ri thout 
coming across one instance of clearly communicated, 
sensitively accurate, empathetic understanding. But 
it has a tremendously releasing effect when it occurs. 
(p. 112) 
Rogers summed up the importance of these three sets of 
attitudes by writing that 
Those attitudes which aprear effective in promoting 
learning can be described. First of all is a trans-
parent realness in the facilitator, a willingness to be 
a person, to be and to live the thoughts of the moment. 
When this realness includes a prizing, a caring, a 
trust and respect for the learner, the climate for 
learning is enhanced. When it includes a sensitive and 
accurate empathetic listening, then indeed a freeing 
climate, stimulative of self-initiated learning and 
growth, exists. (p. 126). 
Rogers also addressed the behavioral-humanist dilemma 
which he describes as a deep paradox with which we must 
learn to live. 
A part of modern living is to face the paradox that, 
vie\'red from one persuective, man is a complex 
machine. We are every da;r moving tm·rard a more 
precise understanding and a more nrecise control of 
this objective mechanism which \'Te ca 11 man. On the 
other hand, in another significant dimension of his 
existence, man is subjectively free; his personal 
choice and responsibility account for the shape of 
his life; he is in fact the·architect of himself. 
(p. 275) 
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In the exploration of signification issues relating to 
the use of objectives, Gagne (1972) and Kneller (1972) 
assumed positions for and against, respectively, the use of 
behavioral objectives in education. 
Gagne affirmed the validity of behavioral objectives 
in education by arguing that they aid communication among 
and between the various participants in an organized 
educational system. He stated that constructing behavioral 
objectives adds legitimacy to such an organized educational 
system as·they communicate what the student will have 
learned from instruction and what class of performances he 
or she will then be able to exhibit. He assumed that 
predefined objectives are legitimate and criticized the 
opponents of objectives for their vagueness and lack of 
certainty. 
Kneller, on the other hand, rejected the use of behavioral 
objectives for three reasons. First, the task of developing 
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group and individualized behavioral objectives is too time-
consuming and complex. Second, behavioral objectives tend to 
exclude idiosyncratic learning, and, third, the assumption 
that learning, knowing, and behaving are synonymous is a 
false assumption. Kneller suggested the alternative of 
"specified" objectives constructed by the teacher and based 
on his or her own model of learning. The purpose of these 
objectives would be to take the student's talents and choices 
into account, communicate expectations to the student, and 
make the student aware of his or her peers' achievements. 
These two articles had limitations in that Gagne paid 
no attention to the process of learning on an individual 
basis, and Kneller misrepresented the behavioral model and 
refuted its research with his opinions. 
Macdonald and Clark (1974) summarized the "empirical 
state of the art in curriculum making" by noting the lack of 
productivity, from a research standpoint, in separating 
curriculum from instruction. They proposed that the smallest 
researchable unit is the "treatment" which consists of 
objectives, materials, media, methods and the isolatable 
subvariables \'li thin each of these areas. They also pointed 
out that there is a paucity of data concerning the outcomes 
of treatments in relation to individual learners. 
The authors see the current state of the art in terms 
of summative evaluation, the development of curricula in 
social settings other than the instructional setting, 
individual variation in the learner, the problems of objec-
tives, and the relationship of objectives to media. 
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Summative evaluation focuses on measurable achievement 
elements and treats the process of curriculum making as a 
given. This is a clear phenomenological/empirical separation 
that divides curriculum from instruction. A wholistic 
conception of the curriculum and curriculum making is 
necessary for effective research enterprises. 
These authors pointed out that curricula are developed 
in social settings that are different from instruction 
settings. Thus they have a collection of ''social roles, 
rewards, status and prestige opportunities'' that are 
different from the variables existing in instructional 
settings. The variables ar~ usually unknown or unpredictable 
during the developmental process. 
Additionally, individual variations in learners are 
seen as major influences upon what learning takes place in 
the curriculum. The authors doubted the validity of the 
curriculum development logic chain that excludes these social 
system variables in addition to ignoring the differences in 
individual learning. 
The authors asserted that problems with curricular 
objectives arise when the questions of curricular scope and 
significance are framed in the context of a discipline, 
social need, or learner preference. These three referents 
must be integrated through value judgements. They pointed 
out that objectives are inherently value-laden and cited 
evidence that these value assumptions should be clearly 
stated before analyzing society, knowledge, and learner 
needs as the bases for objectives formulation. They \'Trote 
that "curriculum development is a continuous process of 
making human value judgements about what to include and 
exclude, what to aim for and miss, and how to go about it, 
albeit aided and abetted by technical and scientific data 
and processes" (p. 408). 
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It was pointed out that vague and directionless objec-
tives may be generated if they are not developed within the 
context of materials, media, and methods; ho\'Jever, further 
difficulty arises if this constellation is separated from 
the actual classroom experi~nce. McLuhan's "the medium is 
the message" slogan was cited to illustrate that style may 
be as important as content, and that the a priori development 
of content may be ineffective in practice. 
vJhat is needed, r·1acdonald and Clark concluded, is a 
focus on the critical value questions by curriculists. These 
value questions focus on the referents of society, knowledge, 
and the learner; value questions about priorities among the 
referents and selection from each should be a focus of the 
curriculum researcher or worker. "The crux of value 
problems rests in the decision-making process and the 
suggested events and/or behaviors that are involved," the 
authors wrote. They pointed otit that the fundamental 
problems are moral and suggested a clarification of goals 
and the selection of values to be pursued. 
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So far, the literature described illustrates that the 
curriculum field is, to some extent, characterized by 
conflict. It has been shown that there are numerous schemes 
by which curricula can be classified, conceptualized, and 
analyzed. No one scheme emerges as the best way. Several 
important elements in the literature clarify and add 
perspective to the collection of works that follow. First, 
a psychological approach to curriculum models is legitimate 
as long as the terminological difficulty to which Eisner 
referred is overcome. Second, both humanistic and 
behavioral models appear to generate conflict, and both 
seem to have advantages as well as drawbacks. Next, the 
Tyler Rationale continues to have strong support although 
its critics raise questions about its limitations. Also, 
it has been shown how the Tyler model differs from a true 
behavioral model. Fourth, the point that learning is an 
individual process that curriculum makers should take into 
account has been made. Finally, unresolved problems 
centering on value questions, especially as they relate 
to objectives, have been reviewed. 
65 
Dilemma and Reconciliation 
This section will describe literature that deals with 
the schism and synthesis of the behavioral and humanistic 
models in psychology and education. There is a small body of 
literature dealing with the behavioral-humanist dilemma 
compared to the extensive writings that argue for or against 
one of the models. These works move beyond the limited 
perspective of advocating one position while denigrating the 
other and are characterized to some extent by an attempt to 
unify these two approaches. The purpose of this essay is to 
add to that small, but growing body of literature. Addi-
tionally, a number of works that are closely related to the 
reconciliation of the behaviorist-humanist dilemma have been 
" organized into this section. 
As an introduction, Hilgard's thoughts on the puzzling 
history of psychology's influence on education are 
described. 
Hilgard (1976) wrote that the psychology of learning 
and educational practices should "fit together as hand-in-
glove" (p. 203), but there is little to suggest that this 
is, in fact, the situation. Hilgard termed the relationship 
between the two "puzzling," but asserts that it can be 
understood and improved. He stated that from a historical 
point of view, psychologists have demonstrated little 
interest in the application of their findings to educational 
settings on a sustained basis. Additionally, educators have 
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had difficulty interpreting the often ambiguous data 
generated by psychological research and have found few clear 
guidelines for its application. 
Hilgard summarized his thoughts on ho"' psychology and 
educational practice can form a more harmonious relationship 
by outlining four difficulties which must be addressed: 
First, educational psychologists, in the study of 
classroom learning, have identified themselves too much 
with the general experimental psychologists who study 
learning with different goals in mind. Second, 
educational psychologists, as previously noted, have 
had too little responsible relationship to instruction 
in the schools, especially in the planning and 
managerial aspects. Third, the caution that 
researchers feel about their findings means that they 
are seldom willing to make effective prescriptions 
based on conclusive thinking. Fourth, the institutional 
characteristics of the school make it difficult for 
changes to be influenced by research findings. 
Schooling is more likely to be influenced as a result 
of pressure groups, popular fads, or available funds. 
(pp. 216-217) 
Confrontations between humanist Carl Ro~ers and 
behaviorist B. F. Skinner occurred in 1956 and again in 
1962 (Rogers & Skinner, 1956, 1976). The different 
positions proposed in these debates have often been cited to 
illustrate their irreconcilability. According to Skinner, 
Man's behavior is primarily the result of his environ-
ment; that a science of behavior must rely on objective 
measures of observable behaviors; that the "inner man" 
might exist but that this subjective self is unimportant 
in controlling his behavior; and that man can control 
his own behavior by the application of the principles 
of o~erant conditioning. (Rogers & Skinner, 1976, 
p. 4) 
Rogers' opposing view was thAt 
r1an 's behavior was primarily a result of his self and 
the self actualizing forces; a science of man should 
rely primarily on the subjective aspects of human 
behavior; unless man creates a society where the 
individual can become freer, totalitarian society will 
result • ( p. 5) 
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This polarization led to the conclusions of a later disserta-
tion, which stated 
The nucleus, vitality, of Skinner's thought is a desire 
for control, of Rogers' thought a desire for lack of 
control. Such contrary desires are irreconciliable. 
To follow the desires of either man leads one in the 
opposite direction from that indicated by the desires 
of the other. An educator, therefore, cannot follow 
both approaches simultaneously. Skinner desires an 
educational environment which yields precise control 
and predictable terminal behavior; the product is most 
important in his view. Rogers desires an educational 
environment which allows maximum personal choice; the 
process is most important in his view. To choose one 
scheme is to undermine the goals of the other. To try 
to follow suggestions from both is, essentially, to 
abandon both. (Swaim, !.973, p. '~957-A) 
There were, however~ points of agreement during both 
debates. During the first, Rogers reported that 
I am sure that we agree that man--as inaividuals and 
societies--have always endeavored to understand, predict, 
influence, and control human behavior--their own 
behavior and that of others. I believe that we agree 
that behavioral sciences are making and will continue to 
make increasingly rapid progress in the understanding of 
behavior, and that as a consequence the capacity to 
predict and control behavior is developing \·:ith equal 
rapidity. I believe we agree that to deny these advances, 
or to claim that man's behavior cannot be a field of 
science is impossible. (1956, p. 1060) 
During the second debate, Rogers and Skinner agreed that 
a broad view of behavior sciences is necessary for the under-
standing of human behavior; that understanding changes as a 
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result of debates and dialogues between behaviorists and 
humanists; that inner subjective feelings do, in fact, exist; 
and that releasing the "inner freedom" of persons is an 
important goal of psychology. Rogers stated that freedom is 
a phenomenological, as well as an objective reality which 
exists alongside scientific reality. 
Hitt (1969) wrote that the purpose of his article was 
to analyze the argument between the behaviorist and the 
phenomenologist by presenting and analyzing two different 
models of humans. He employed the terms "man" and 
"phenomenologist" in his writings; ho'.·rever, this presentation 
will substitute the terms "humans" and "humanist," 
respectively, as the former is e nonsexist description and 
the latter is considered sy~onymous. 
Hitt attempted to define the behaviorist and humanist 
positions by describing how each views humans and "'hat 
methodology is deemed appropriate for their study: 
The behaviorist views the human as a passive organism 
governed by external stimuli. The human can be manipu-
lated through proper control of these stimuli. Moreover, 
the laws that govern the human are essentially the same 
as the laws that govern all natural phenomena of the 
world; hence, it is assumed that the scientific method 
used by the physical scientist is equally appropriate to 
the study of humans. 
The humanist views the human as the source of acts; he 
is free to choose in each situation. The essence of the 
h~man is inside the ~uman; he or she is controlled by 
h1s or her own consc1ousness. The most appropriate 
methodology for the study of the human is phenomenology, 
which begins with the world of experience. (p. 652) 
The author then listed ten "arguments" between the 
behaviorist and humanist campuses and maintained that there 
is support for poth_sides of the controversy. 
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The first contrasting view is that humans can be 
described meaningfully in terms of their behaviors, or humans 
can be described meaningfully in terms of their conscious-
nesses. Hitt asserted that it is apparent that psychologists 
have been dealing with two different aspects of humans: 
"actions" and "self-awareness." He says that humans can be 
described in terms of either behavior or consciousness or 
both. In his opinion, "behavior is more accessible to 
scientific treatment, but the systematic study of conscious-
ness might well give the psychologist additional understanding 
of rna n" ( p • 6 53 ) • ' 
The second contrasting view is that humans are 
predictable, or humans are unpredictable. Hitt pointed out 
that there have been both notable successes and notable 
failures in attempts to predict human behavior. He wrote 
that it is difficult to take issue with the determinist view 
that there are sufficient causes for human actions; however, 
it is apparent that these causes may be unknown to either 
the observer or the sub~ect. He concluded that we must see 
humans as both predictable and unpredictable. 
The third contrasting view is that humans are 
information transmitters, or humans are information 
generators. Hitt pointed out that the information-
transmitting model is very compelling because of its rigor 
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and precision, its compatibility with empiricism and 
stimulus-response theory, and its cumulative nature. On the 
other hand, humans identify ne\'r problems, generate new ideas 
and theories, formulate new courses of action, and even 
formulate "new models" of humans. He asserted that "to say 
that all of these human activities are merely a regrouping 
or recombining of existing elements is an oversimplification, 
a trivialization of human activity" (p. 654). His 
conclusion was that humans can be viewed as both a dependent 
variable and an independent variable within the context of 
this argument. 
The fourth contrasting view is that humans live in an 
objective world, or humans live in a subjective world. The 
heart of this argument rests on two types of knowledge that 
Hitt identified. He said that humans can objectively know 
about something and also subjectively experience something 
and that these two forms of knowledge are not the same. He 
wrote that the world looks at humans, and humans look out at 
the world. The methods of science can be employed to explore 
the objective aspects of humans and the methods of 
phenomenology can be applied to the subjective aspects, and 
the psychologist should attempt to understand both worlds. 
The fifth contrasting view is that humans are rational 
beings, or humans are irrational beings. Hitt pointed out 
that human actions are guided by both empirical knowledge 
and value judgement. "Empirical knowledge belongs to the 
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rational world, whereas value judgement often belongs to the 
arational world" (p. 654). Hitt viewed rationality and 
irrationality as being on the same continuum whereas 
arationality is not. He concludes that in order to achieve 
greater understanding of humans, both the rational and 
arational worlds must be investigated. 
The sixth contrasting view is that one human is like 
another human, or each human is unique. Hitt pointed out 
that there is evidence to support the possibility of 
developing general laws of human behavior, especially the 
work of the behavioral psychologists and cultural anthro-
pologists. However, he pointed out, no two persons live in 
exactly the same environment, and there are thousands of 
possible gene combinations and environmental determinants , 
that support the notion of individual uniqueness. Therefore, 
humans are governed by general laws that apply to all 
persons, but are individually unique in a nontrivial way. 
The seventh contrasting view is that humans can be 
described meaningfully in absolute terms, or humans can be 
described meaningfully in relative terms. The author 
asserted that on the one hand there appear to be some 
irrefutable absolute natural laws such as conditioning 
principles to humans, but on the other hand absoluteness in 
the area of standards is arbitrary. For example, what is 
natural behavior? Depending on what aspect of human 
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behavior is being described, it can be meaningfully described 
in either absolute terms or relative terms, be concluded. 
The eighth contrasting view is that human character-
istics can be investigated independently of one another, or 
must be studied·as a whole. The author stated that useful 
results have resulted by investigating a single character-
istic independently of other characteristics, but the 
importance of the interactions and interdependencies 
operating in any given situation is apparent. He stated 
that analysis is necessary for systematic understanding, 
and synthesis is essential in order to understand the 
interactions and interdependencies, and that an interplay 
between analysis and synthesis should be the most effective 
strategy for the behavioral scientist. 
The ninth contrasting view is that the human being is 
a reality, or the human being is a potentiality. Hitt posed 
the question as to whether we can study humans as an 
actually existing entity, such as any other complex system, 
or as a constantly emerging or becoming dynamic entity. He 
answered that humans can be reliably measured in some 
respects as any other complex system, but that humans are 
changeable and can become something quite different from 
what they were in the past. Therefore, a human represents 
objective existence, yet can move toward any one of many 
different states that are essentially unpredictable. 
The tenth contrasting view is that humans are knowable 
in scientific terms, or humans are more than we can ever 
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know about them. Hitt noted that this argument is basic to 
the entire study of humans and is closely tied to all of the 
other contrasting views. He wrote that the view that 
persons are scientifically knowable has its roots in 
antiquity, was a concern \'Jhen the first experimental psycho-
logy laboratory was founded in 1879, and is supported by the 
recent experimental and field studies in the areas of 
behavioral and social sciences. However, he asserted, the 
theory of evolution points toward human transcendence, and 
the process of gaining new knowledge about themselves changes 
human beings. Therefore, he suggested, humans are "open 
systems." He concluded that humans are "scientifically 
knowable--at least to a point. Yet there is no evidence to 
support the idea that humans are--or ever will be--completely 
kno\'Table" (p. 657). 
Hitt offered four general conclusions after analyzing 
and commenting on the ten contrasting views. First, the 
behaviorist-humanist debate is not just an academic exercise 
because the acceptance of either model has important impli-
cations for the influencing of human activities in education 
and other areas. Second, it would be premature for 
psychology to accept either model as the "final model" as 
there is truth in both views. Third, both models may be 
useful depending upon the problem under study. He suggested 
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that the humanistic model may be appropriate for the study of 
creativity while the behavioral model could be useful in 
examining environmental determinants. Finally, he asserted 
that proponents of both points of view "should listen to each 
other," attempt to understand both points of view, and 
encourage "dialogue" (p. 657). 
Krasner (1978) examined what be termed the behaviorist-
humanist "dialogue" in a historical context which points out 
the commonality of roots in terms of philosophical 
influences and social objectives. 
The author asserted that the humanists have developed a 
lexicon of pleasant terms such as self-actualization, 
personal growth, sensitivity, dignity, and trust whereas the 
behaviorists have developed a far scarcer lexicon, with terms 
such as reinforcement, contingencies, stimulus control, and 
behavioral management. He hypothesized that 
to the extent that there is any similarity between these 
descriptive terms and human behavior in real environments, 
both sets of postulates about human behavior are 
relatively correct and, when reduced to specific 
operations of measurement, describe the same processes. 
(p. 799) 
Krasner stated that a problem has been generated as both 
protagonists "hide behind big brother metaphors that explain 
everything and protect them from the evil of their 
opponents" (p. 799). Behaviorism, he wrote, hides behind 
the metaphor of science, and humanism itself is, in fact, a 
metaphor. These metaphors and labels have become reified and 
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serve as slogans and rallying cries and have implications for 
professional behavior. One major implication is that 
professionals in the fields of psychology, psychiatry, social 
work, and education are reinforced by the academic, 
professional, and scholarly community for the "development 
of new labels, controversy, leadership of new movements, 
publications, symposia, the development of associations with 
individual labels, leaders, splinter groups, disciples, 
interpreters, dissenters, and slogans" (p. 800). 
Krasner listed seven commonalities that these two 
approaches share and implied that there exists a greater 
degree of resemblance than is generally acknowledged. The 
commonalities are: a desire to create a better world; a 
belief in individualism, freedom, and human dignity; the 
"fallibility-probability" conceptual parallelism; the 
rejection of the disease model of undesirable human behavior; 
optimism as to the changeability of individual behavior; a 
break with authority and tradition; and the hypothesis about 
the locus of human behavior that is both situational and 
interactive. 
This author also offered the interesting notion that it 
is appropriate that Carl Rogers be seen as "scientific" and 
B. F. Skinner as "humanistic." He supported this position 
by noting that Rogers initiated and stimulated research, from 
the scientific standpoint, in his early work. Krasner 
asserted that "we have a clear cut candidate for the 
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originator of the behavior modification movement in Carl 
Rogers" (p. 801). Likewise, B. F. Skinner, who espoused the 
humanistic values of happiness and fulfillment for 
individuals, an individualism that was referenced to the 
rights and desires of the group, and the equality of women 
in \~alden Two, can be labeled a "humanist." The author 
commented that "it is puzzling why the followers of the 
humanist Skinner and the scientist Rogers did not realize 
that a united social movement of these two forces would have 
had even greater impact on psychology and American society 
than actually occurred" (p. 803). 
Krasner noted that a discussion of the future of the 
humanist-behaviorist dialogue represents a combination of 
observation, prediction, and wish. He sees that some of the 
proponents of both positions would decrease mutual battling 
and join against the common foe of explaining behavior in 
terms of mentalistic pathology and join the mutual goal of 
"developing a broader methodology for assisting people to 
design their own environments for a humane, humanistic world 
of 'reasonably satisfied' people" (p. 803). In addition, 
he sees a convergence of the objectivity-subjectivity 
positions which acknowledges that true objectivity has its 
limits. 
Krasner also predicted that an increasing focus on the 
value decisions of the influencer, or trainer, of behavior 
will become important in this dialogue. He sees the future 
77 
of this dialogue as residing "in the emergence of new models 
and approaches to conceptualizing and changing human 
behavior" but points out that there will be "serious 
opposition" to the emerging humanist-behaviorist-
environmentalist position because it threatens "authority" 
and "elitist expertise" (p. 803). 
Bandura (1969) stated that freedom and determinism are 
not incompatible from the perspective of social learning 
theory. He wrote that 
Whether freedom and determinism are compatible or 
irreconciliable depends upon the manner in which causal 
processes are conceptualized. According to prevailing 
theories of personality, human actions are either 
compelled from within by concealed forces or externally 
predetermined. If individuals were merely passive 
reactors to external influences, then their behavior 
would be inevitable; it would be absurd to commend them 
for their achievements or to penalize them for their 
transgressions. It would be more sensible, from this 
point of view, to praise and chastize the external 
determinants. But since these events are also determined 
by prior conditions, the analysis results in an infinite 
regression of causes. Some degree of freedom is 
possible within a deterministic view if it is recognized 
that a person's behavior is a contributing factor to 
subsequent causal events. (p. 88) 
Gelso (1970) explored the freedom-determinism 
controversy, which he described as an "ancient philosophical 
issue," with the aim of resolving it within the framework of 
a paradox. He described this issue as focusing 
upon whether man's behavior either is determined by 
factors outside of his control or is the result of his 
own free choices. Are man's actions, thoughts, and 
feelings completely determined by antecedent and 
attendant factors or, conversely, is man at least to 
some extent a free agent, capable of free choice and 
able to transcend the influence of his environment and 
genetic makeup? (p. 271) 
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Gelso pointed out that this issue is still quite alive 
within the discipline of psychology, but has received little 
attention by counselors because of several factors that 
appear to relate also to curriculum workers. He pointed out 
the practical nature of counseling which deemphasizes philo-
sophical undergirdings, that the "scientist" model has been 
adopted by relatively few counselors, and that counselors 
traditionally see humans as "free agents." He saw a trend 
toward more philosophical, empirical, and model-building 
activities on the part of counselors during which the 
freedom-determinism issue will become more prominent. He 
pointed out that this issue is bound to provoke conflict. 
The author outlined the 11 lor;ic of scientific deter-
minism." The basic tenets of this position are that all 
human events are determined by causal factors which are a 
person's past environment, genetic endowment, and present 
stimulus situation. Behaviors, thoughts, or feelings are 
functions of the interaction of the three. The deterministic 
position asserts that inner states either have no functional 
relationship with behavior, or that inner states are a 
function of antecedent, attendant, and genetic factors. 
Gelso offered several definitions that can be described 
as mainstream deterministic vocabulary. "Determinism" used 
in a generic sense may refer to such diverse forms as 
mechanistic, teleological, psychic, and others. "Causes" 
may refer to physical, chemical, biological, psychological, 
social, rational, cultural, economic and other factors. 
"Freedom" is the absence of causes, and the terms "causal 
relationship" and "functional relationship" are synonymous, 
as are the terms "cause" and "control." 
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The opponents of determinism have offered eight general 
objections, in an attempt to refute the causality model. 
First, each human is unique a·nd not amenable to causal 
description and predictability. Second, even if causal 
order exists, human behavior is too complex for any permanent 
discoveries in this area. Third, human behavior is oriented 
to future goals and is determined by these goals. Fourth, a 
causal model of human behavior negates the importance of 
choices, responsibility, punishment, and guilt. Fifth, the 
determinist can not argue that the acceptance of determinism 
was through choice since it was conditioned. Sixth, in view 
of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle as applied to physics, 
it seems impossible to attempt to predict complex human 
behavior. Seventh, since physicists accept "change," how 
can complex human behavior be assumed to be completely 
determined? Eighth, deterministic psychology is tied to an 
outdated mechanistic physics concept and therefore invalid. 
Gelso responded to these objections by noting 
"fallacies" in the arguments and suggesting that 
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misinterpretation of the deterministic position is the cause. 
Indeed, a close examination of the above arguments 
suggests that most of them are not relevant to whether 
or not strict determinism in human affairs is a valid 
assumption. In summary, Arguments 1, 2, and 6 refer to 
the likelihood of ever finding all of the causes of 
behavior, and not to \'lhether causes exist; Arguments 
3 and 8 essentially criticize one type of determinism 
(i.e., mechanistic-physicalistic); and 3 substitutes in 
its place another type, that is, teleological determinism. 
Argument 4 refers to the undesirability of determinism, 
since the subjective adoption of such a belief may have 
negative practical and moral consequences. Argument 5 
curiously implies that if determinism is valid, a 
determinist cannot argue for its validity, since his 
beliefs are determined. This argument ignores the 
possibility that reality (the world as it is) is one 
of the major determinants of beliefs. Finally, Argument 
7 equates chance with freedom. However, since chance is 
more likely to lead to randomness, one could hardly 
suggest that people are free when their behavior is 
determined by chance factors. (p. 273) 
It is important to note here that Gelso was not making a 
case against free will, but was refuting anti-determinism. 
By noting some basic misunderstandings of the deterministic 
language including terms such as "freedom" and "control," 
he pointed out that it is "unlikely that the validity of 
strict determinism can ever be ultimately 'proven'" (p. 274), 
but that when human behavior is viewed objectively there is 
little support for the notion that this behavior is free from 
causation. 
Gelso commented that the "lor:;ic and necessity of 
subjective freedom" is culturally reinforced, and is neither 
uniquely American nor restricted to ~'lestern culture. Many 
professionals "do not accept strict determinism because 
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people, including psychologists, continuously experience the 
introspective realness of freedom" (p. 274). He pointed out 
that although determinism appears to be a logical and 
scientifically useful construct, few people can live as 
though they are determined objects. Psychologically healthy 
persons, as contrasted with neurotics and psychotics, are 
more likely to see themselves as experiencing freedom of 
choice. He stated that "persons not only do, but in a very 
real way, need to experience freedom subjectively" (p. 275), 
.t;nd that there is a probability that this subjectively 
experienced freedom of choice is actually an important 
determinant of behavior: 
The introspective realness of the experience of freedom 
of choice, independent of one's learning histor,y and 
present environmental influences, is what seemingly non-
deterministically theorists such as Rogers and Maslow 
imply in their writing. While frequently misinterpreted, 
careful scrutiny of Rogers' work reveals that he is 
deterministic when viewing man from an objective, 
scientific perspective. Only when he discusses the 
inner experience of man does Ro~ers propose a free-choice 
model. (p. 275) 
Gelso resolved this issue by suggesting the existence 
of a "two-dimensional paradox" in \tlhich strict determinism 
and free will are both necessary and valid assumptions. 
However, they are valid and necessary along two separate, and 
mutually exclusive, dimensions which utilize different 
sources of information. These dimensions can be termed the 
"objective-scientific-outer dimension" and the "subjective-
ascientific-inner dimension" and can be conceptualized as 
being experienced alternately in the temporal sense. Thus, 
Gelso was arguing against the simultaneous experiencing of 
both dimensions but, since he did not specify a temporal 
frame of reference, he did not rule out the subjective 
perception of both occurring at the same time. 
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Specifically, Gelso described the objective-scientific-
outer dimension as human behavior determined by antecedent 
and attendant conditions. A person's source of information 
is himself, objectively and analytically examined apart from 
his own inner experiencing. This mode of information may 
also operate v1hen "objectively" observing other persons and 
analyzing the causes of their behavior. The subjective-
ascientific-inner dimension has as its source of information 
a person's own subjective experiencing or the empathetic 
experiencing of another person. This dimension is useful 
as the experiencing of oneself or another as fully determined 
may have "disastrous" conseouences. He added that "when 
conceptualizing behavior on this dimension, persons can be 
seen as active rather than simply reactive, as subjects 
rather than determined objects, and as 'pilots' rather than 
'robots"' (p. 276). These two different models of reality 
emerge when humans view themselves and others from the 
perspectives of two different sources of information. 
Gelso concluded by suggesting that we will have to live 
with the contradiction of both free-will and deterministic 
models as valid and useful and accept the possibility of 
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"multiple realities" (p. 277). He recommended that future 
research and thinking be aimed at clarifying "(a) the extent 
to which and (b) the crucial points at which persons should 
be experienced subjectively as free agents or analyzed 
objectively as determined objects" (p. 277). Such research 
would be difficult to conceptualize and implement, but, he 
added, "Is this not the case in most meaningful areas of 
human interaction?" (p. 277). 
Ricks, Wandersman, and Poppen (1976) reported that their 
principal interest is "the degree to \'Thich the humanist and 
behaviorist positions, each of which has its oen integrity 
and theoretical coherence, may be converging into a new 
synthesis" (p. 383). They do not expect a total convergence 
of the two positions, and even if that were possible, they 
have doubts regarding the productiveness of such a complete 
merger. However, they stated that we appear to be on the 
verge of a creative synthesis that can unite large parts of 
the two approaches "into a broader social developmental view 
of the human being as an active organizer of his own 
particular environment over time" (p. 384). Such a synthesis 
is important as it has the potential to revitalize the under-
standing of human nature, choice, freedom, and the meanings 
commonly imparted to life. There is a better climate for a 
synthesis no\'r the name-calling, sloganeering, and bitter 
attacks that have separated and polarized the two positions 
appear to be past history. 
The authors pointed out some of the attempts at 
synthesis including efforts to de-emphasize the humanist-
behaviorist dichotomy, the attachment of the label 
"humanistic" to behavioral programs (when "humanitarian" 
would have served more appropriately), and the integration 
of concepts from both positions. The work in social 
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learning is a type of "behavioral humanism"; Gilda Gold's 
"affective behaviorism" is a composite of behavioral and 
humanistic goals and methods. Additionally, Allan 
Goldstein's approach to assertiveness training is a synthesis 
of behavioristic methods and humanistic goals. 
The authors rejected the notion that the "paradigm 
clash between humanism and behaviorism can only be resolved 
on non-empirical grounds" (p. 384). 'l'hey presented four 
declarative conclusions and offered evidence for each. 
First, "Neither behaviorism nor humanism is reducible 
to the other, and neither can be completely incorporated 
into the perspectives of the other" (p. 385). Behaviorism 
cannot be reduced to humanism because the latter position 
presently has no way of incorporating the multiplicity of 
be.havioral techniques within its framework. However, within 
a therapeutic context, the so-called "nonspecific factors" 
of the therapist's personal contribution have been 
specifically and operationally described in terms of warmth, 
empathy, genuineness and the like. Humanism cannot be 
reduced to behaviorism presently as the humanistic view of 
the complex behavioral paradigm is often a one-dimensional 
and simplistic stereotype. The authors asserted that "what 
is needed is not submission of one system to the other, or 
translation of the language of one approach into the 
language of another, but a creative synthesis of the two." 
Each system can complement and fill in the weaknesses of 
the other. 
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Second, "Humanism and behaviorism are reconcilable" 
(p. 387). The authors opposed the arguments that the two 
are diametrically opposite vie\ITS and that coexistence or 
detente is the closest reconciliation they can tolerate. 
There are so many areas of agreement that it is no longer 
necessary to continue to see the t"talO sides as opposites. 
That progress beyond mere coexistence is possible is 
evidenced by the employment of the most popular of several 
possible syntheses: the use of behavioristic techniques to 
reach humanistic goals. Other syntheses are also possible. 
Third, "Existing areas of agreement provide the growing 
points around which new syntheses of humanism and behaviorism 
are already developing" (p. 390). Four areas of agreement 
are presented as evidence in support of this claim: (1) It 
is easy to associate "humanism" with "humane," but the 
indications are that behaviorists are just as value prone to 
alleviate suffering and promote development as are humanists. 
(2) Both humanists and social-learning therapists are 
concerned with the person as an active organism. (3) The 
86 
methods of humanists and behaviorists may lead to similar 
results. (4) Both are willing to subject experience to 
research results. The authors amplified this point by noting 
Rogers' pioneering empirical studies on psychotherapy and 
the behaviorists' willingness to follow. However, they said 
that the Rogerians have had a tendency to have their ideas 
governed by dogma rather than natural consequences. 
Fourth, "Broader perspectives may incorporate both 
humanism and behaviorism into more comprehensive positions" 
(p. 391). "Both traditional humanism and laboratory-based 
behaviorism were in trouble as soon as they tried to 
conceptualize the interactions of the person with his natural 
environment" (p. 391). The authors explained that 
This lack of concern for the environment may account 
for the solopsistic quality of many humanistic 
interior journeys. Humanists might do better here if 
they remained aware of the human environment, and of 
man as a social animal whose autonomy grows as he 
increases his options in society, not as he withdraws 
from it. (p. 391) 
The authors recommended the development of broader 
perspectives which are oriented around some conception of 
the person's development over time in a society that is 
itself changing. These broader perspectives would recognize 
"empirical interconnectedness" as a postulate. 
Staats (1975) wrote that general conceptions about 
human nature have been based on theology, world views, and 
scholarly or scientific traditions. These conceptions are 
important, he said, because they form the bases for social 
actions and decisions. The objective versus subjective 
positions as conceptions of human behavior constitute an 
ancient philosophical argument that is also a continuing 
theme in psychology and other social sciences. Staats 
pointed out that the dichotomization of psychology into 
conceptions thet view human behavior as either internal, 
mental, and subjective or external, behavioral, and 
objective gained impetus through the efforts of the 
supporters of early "elemental behaviorism" who were 
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reacting against the late nineteenth-century introspectionist 
school of psychology. He said that 
It was John Watson, the first self-conscious behaviorist, 
who indicated the drawbacks to the subjective method of 
introspection as the basis for a science of psychology. 
He rejected the method of introspection and indicated, 
rather, that the objective, public observation of 
behavior and the stimuli that influenced behavior were 
the proper subject matter of psychology. He rejected 
concern with such matters as feelings, thoughts, images, 
perceptions, sensations, and so on, unless they were 
specified by direct observations of behavior. (p. 462) 
The author pointed out that Watson's position was a useful 
corrective for the problems of the psychology of his day, 
but that it has been unnecessarily continued by present-day 
radical and elemental behaviorists. 
Such concepts as attitudes, feelings, interests, 
purposes, goals, awareness, perceptions, communication, 
values, meaning, and so on are still not considered, 
even though theoretical and methodological developments, 
as has been indicated, have made this possible. Thus, 
elemental behaviorism has influenced a considerable 
number of contemporary psychologists to ignore internal 
responding, limiting themselves to concern with instru-
mental behaviors. This influence has led to 
inconsistencies in some positions, including internal 
response concepts in some analyses but not in others. 
For example, some social learning theories have 
considered attitudes to be inconsequential to the 
determination of the individual's instrumental 
behavior, while accepting other internal response 
concepts. (p. 463) 
Staats listed fourteen characteristics and concerns 
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dividing the humanistic and behavioristic approaches to the 
study of man. By "behavioristic approach," he meant an 
elemental and operant type of behavioral psychology '\'rhich 
categorically denies and excludes internal events from its 
explanation of human nature. The issues are listed with the 
humanistic positions on the left and the elemental 
behavioristic positions on the right. 
1. Subjective events 1. Objective events 
2. Holistic (man as a 2. Atomistic (elementary 
whole) principle 
3. Naturalistic observation 3. Laboratory observation 
4. Individual (Ideographic) 4. General (Nomethetic) 
5. Qualitative description 5. Precision and measurement 
6. Understanding 6. Prediction and control 
?. Self-determination, ?. Scientific determinism, 
freedom, spontaneity mechanistic in causation 
in causation 
8. Originality, creativity, 8. Passive respondent, 
and activity automatonism· 
9. Self-actualization, 9. Conditioning; behavior 
personal growth, modification, and 
personality development behavior therapy 
10. Values in science 10. Valueless science 
11. Applied concern with 11. Basic, pure science; 
human problems science for science's 
sake 
12. Purpose and goals, 12. Prior and present 
future causation causation 
13. Insight and awareness 
14. Biological explanation 
of human behavior 
13. Conditioning 
14. Environmentalism 
(Po 462 
Staats proposed that a rapprochement of a number of 
these divisive characteristics and concerns can be effected 
through the "social behaviorism" paradigm which he has 
constructed. This paradigm is comprehensive and complex 
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and will not be reported in detail for this essay. It is 
essentially a behavioral approach that includes classical 
and operant levels as well as attitudinal, emotional levels. 
Staats sees attitudes as part of a behavioral repertoire 
that directs behavior. They are products of conditioning 
processes and are also causes. He proposed a three-function 
learning theory, an emotional-motivational mechanism, and a 
personality system. His "A-R-D" theory sees social 
interaction as an important part of human behavior. The 
Staatsian approach activity works for compatibility with 
clinical, educational, and developmental psychology, psycho-
metrics, social and biological sciences, as well as humanism. 
It is the prominent addition of the attitudinal, emotional, 
and personality level which distinguishes his work from 
that of earlier behaviorists, against whom much of the 
criticism of the humanists has been directed, primarily 
because of their denial of internal, mental events. 
The author wrote that it is unfortunate to reject one 
approach at the cost of the other as they can be unified 
under a common framework of social behaviorism. This type 
of rapprochement would have the following salient features: 
(1) emotional and cognitive events and overt instru-
mental behaviors can be dealt with in the framework of 
the same principles, (2) this can be done in an 
empirical manner, (3) verbal reports of subjective 
experiences can 1ndex subjective states, and (4) sub-
jective states are causes, not epiphenomena. (p. 463) 
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"Awareness," according to Staats, can be behaviorally 
described as the individual's recognition of the 
contingencies in ~Thich he or she is involved. Concern 't'Tith 
the individual and his or her history is compatible \'lith an 
approach that examines the elemental, general laws of 
behavior if a personality level to the theory is included. 
Staats proposed a reconciliation on the issue of purpose and 
scientific causation by reporting that 
scientific causation moves along a time dimension--
earlier events can determine later events, but not 
the converse. Future events do not affect events 
that have already happened. When it is said that 
man's goals affect his present behavior, and the 
goals are conceived as events in the future, then 
this abrogates the "rules of causality" that have 
generally been found in science. Elemental behaviorism 
has not resolved this dilemma, restricting itself to 
the study of present events that affect the behavior 
of the organism. 
How then is the dilemma to be resolved? It is 
suggested that future events, in a sense, can be 
conceived of as determining behaviors that occur 
before those events. This is "in a sense," ho't'rever, 
for it is actually the reasoning and planning sequences 
of the individual that are relevant to those future 
events and determine the individual's action. (p. 472) 
Staats continued by explaining the paradox of personal 
freedom and scientific determinism from his point of view. 
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\'/hat seems like a pair of mutually exclusive, 
antagonistic positions, ho,.rever, need not be. Human 
behavior can be considered caused by other material, 
natural events--not uncaused (spontaneous), capricious, 
or supernaturally caused events--without rejecting the 
originality, activity, and self-direction characteristic 
of man and the experience of freedom and spontaneity. 
It is suggested that the laws of learning, elementary 
and human, are causative laws and the individual is what 
he has learned, and he is affected also by the present 
conditions to which he is subjected. The personal 
freedom, self-direction, creativity, and spontaneity 
that we experience can 1nvolve the way that individuals 
extend their past learning through reasoning, planning, 
purposeful goals, and so on, many times including 
original combinations of behavior that have not been 
learned. (p. 477) 
He added that the phenomenological experience of determining 
one's.own behavior arises from self-observation of causal 
processes and that "a theory of man must have a place for 
this pervasive experience of inner self-determination" (p. 
478). 
He then addressed the issue of values in science and 
humanism and pointed out that the study of humans can be 
scientific and planned in regard to human and social 
problems and "be humanistic in its values concerning human 
welfare" (p. 489). He concluded his discussion by calling 
for a unified general conception of human behavior: 
There are essential aspects of both that can be combined 
to yield a framework for studying human behavior, for 
treating problems of human behavior, and for making 
decisions with respect to ourselves and others. Such a 
philosophy of human science, it is suggested, is more 
complete, less erroneous, and more productive than 
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either approach alone. Establishing a unified general 
conception of man is an important part of the task of 
providing a paradigm that can deal with the various 
aspects of the study of man. Prejudices that are out-
growths of one or the other philosophical position can 
only continue to represent barriers to a unified approach. 
(p. 490) 
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This brief report of certain aspects of Staats' position 
shows that he is undoubtedly a "behaviorist"; however, he is 
a humanist in that he believes in emotions and the potency of 
inner events. He shares the humanists' views that elemental 
behaviorism can be criticized as a limited explanation of 
human behavior. Staats' conception is more than a behavioral 
explanation of humanism as it actually adds a phenomenological 
level to behavioral thought. Most importantly, Staats demon-
strates that behavioral and humanistic positions can be 
reconciled, if not unified. 
The follo..,.ring three articles are from the behavioral 
perspective and serve to clarify two important issues. The 
articles by Hayes and Maley (1977) and Lipinski and Lawrence 
(1973) focus on 11 Control," and the selection from Malott 
(1973) introduces the idea of "conceptual analysis" from a 
humanistic behavioral perspective. Following these articles 
will be some ideas from Macdonald on an emerging new 
scientific consciousness, which is one of the themes of 
this essay. 
Hayes and Maley (1977) addressed the issue of coercion 
and control from both the behavioral and legal viewpoints and 
asserted that confrontation between these t\'ro perspectives 
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is a result of "different language games" (p. 8?) or language 
systems. The language system of the legal profession is seen 
as similar to the language of humenists; that is, it is 
"mentalistic." Terms such as "free will," "freedom," and 
"coercion" are employed in legal language, and there is a 
simultaneous view that terms from behavioral language such 
as "behavior modification" and "control" may be viewed as a 
potential threat to civil liberties. The authors emphasized 
the importance of understanding and differentiating the terms 
"coercion" and "control" for both psychologists and attorneys. 
To the lawyer, "coercion" is a type of influence 
reserved by the State and only to be used with adequate 
procedural protections. Coercion is verbally described 
in legal discourse primarily by the absence of other 
qualities 1 such as "freedom," "voluntarism," and "free will." S1nce behaviorism is popularly viewed as 
assuming the absence of "freedom," "voluntarism," and 
"free will, 11 la\'ryers are likely to term the activities 
of behaviorists "coercive" by definition. Therefore 
behaviorism becomes something that l\'layers should 
oppose, or, at least, very carefully monitor. To most 
behaviorists, the legal profession's concerns about 
behavioral control are seen to reflect profound 
ignorance. Behaviorists have a difficult time under-
standin·g the lawyer's preoccupation with coercion and 
control as the major issues in psychological inter-
vention. After all, to the behaviorist, all behavior 
is under some form of control, and, since coercion is 
seemingly held by the law to be synonymous \'lith control, 
concerns about doing away with or even reducing coercive 
practices are thought to be meaningless and pseudo-issues. 
(p. 88) 
These authors asserted that "control" and "coercion" 
are not synonymous, but that coercion may be a type of 
control although control is not, per se, coercive. Their 
analysis of the legal perspective on "coercion" resulted in 
the conclusion that three conditions must be present when the 
term is used: "saliency," the "nature" of control, and the 
"extent" of control. First·, controlling contingencies must 
be salient in situations labeled coercive, and the more 
obvious the control, the more likely it will be seen as 
coercive. The nature of control is likely to be aversive; 
however, coercion may exist when positive reinforcement is 
employed in controller-designed deprivation situations or 
when the situation is relatively barren of positive 
reinforcers. The extent of control is defined by the 
strength of the contingencies and the narrowness of control. 
The authors pointed out that strong controls have a high 
probability of compliance and a narrowness of alternatives--
two elements that define the nature of coercive control. 
Hayes and !-1aley asserted that coercive control is 
generally undesirable for three broad reasons. It promotes 
societal inflexibility, creates the expense of additional 
resources, and contributes to increasingly maladaptive 
practices in a culture. They said that behaviorism may be 
a treatment for a coercive culture by, among other things, 
identifying and clarifying the contingencies operating in 
that culture and by "making cultural practices and decisions 
more understandable and subject to public review" (p. 94). 
One contribution to that goal is the alleviation of 
terminological confusion, according to the authors. 
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Lipinski and Lawrence (1973) have authored a presen-
tation that brings into focus the issue of "control" within 
the context of behavior modification procedures. They 
pointed out that "contracting" is a typical procedure 
employed in the "natural" environments of home and school, 
and that these contracts are usually based on the Premack 
Principle. Often, the authors said, these contracts are 
conceptualized as a one-way process; that is, one part to 
the contract has targeted behavior change and the other 
party controls that change with reinforcement. The authors 
argued that negotiation, a "balance of trade," and 
reciprocity appear to be crucial factors and that these 
contracts may be more accurately seen as a "two-way process 
embodying an exchange of behaviors and reinforcers." The 
implication is that "control" may not be the one-sided 
linear process that it is generally thought to be, but 
rather the "controller" is subject to behavior change in a 
reciprocal manner. 
Macdonald (1975) argued for critical processes that 
focus not only on the dialectic between material conditions 
and consciousness, but go to the deeper level of the 
dialectic between social determinism and the personal 
experience of freedom. He '\'lrote that this approach '!Jrould 
"move beyond the personalistic and individualistic emphasis 
of existentialism and third force psychology" (p. 7). 
Two questions, according to this author, should be 
emphasized: "What potentialities are being dominated by 
unnecessary social constraints on human freedom?" and "How 
can we be more aware of being dominated?" 
The answers, it seems to me, cannot be generated out 
of a simple intermediate social level, but must arise 
out of some "objective" phenomena, or out of our own 
"subjectivity." Thus, it appears that science (not 
scientism) as objective praxis, and religion (broadly 
interpreted, i.e., the search for personal meaning in 
existence) are avenues for developing consciousness 
of domination and potential when we engage in 
scientific and religious praxis and the "universe" 
speaks back. (p. 7) 
An emerging new consciousness of science recognizes 
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that that which appeared to be separable is actually inter-
related in a larger universe of relationships. Although the 
focus of this paper is not primarily directed at the 
reconciliation of behaviorism and humanism, there appears 
to be implicit support for such a notion as a direction 
that may aid in reconceptualizing curriculum processes. 
The collection of articles by Fitt (1976), Dumas (1973), 
Cohen and Hersh (1972), and Smith (1973) represents an 
educational perspective on the behavioral-humanist dilemma 
that parallels the perspective presented in the psychological 
literature. It shows that some educators are addressing 
the dilemma especially as it relates to educational practice. 
Fitt (1976) wrote that there is a "raging dispute 
between behaviorists and humanists" in education and 
claimed that many have adopted a short-sighted "either-or 
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position" (p. 13). 
Educators seem to think that these two approaches are 
mutually exclusive, that they cannot coexist in the same 
classroom. Educators who bold this belief may be right 
if either position is taken to extremes, but total 
adherence to behaviorism or humanism in today's schools 
is rare. (p. 14) 
The author affirmed the validity of reinforcement theory 
which applies even to those who reject those concepts. She 
said that teachers shape the behavior of others whether they 
want to or not and that "to ignore reinforcement techniques 
is to use the tactics of the ostrich: burying one's head 
in the sand" (p. 16). 
Fitt proposed a reconciliation of the two approaches 
. because, as she sees it, humanism is a philosophy and 
behaviorism is a technology. She summed up her position by 
writing that 
Behaviorism is a technology. It supplies the tools 
for behavior modification, such tools as objectives 
stated in behavioral terms and reinforcement theory. 
Humanism is a philosophy. It provides direction, 
ideals, and goals in the pursuit of the "good life." 
These·two approaches need not be at odds with each 
other, for they occupy different domains. (p. 16) 
She advocated the humanistic-behavioral position which uses 
behavioral techniques to reach humanistic goals. 
Dumas (1973) stated that the use of behavioral objec-
tives improves the educational process by decreasing 
aimlessness and disorientation in the classroom. However, 
a narrow approach to their use may lead to dehumanization 
and trivialization, as some humanists have charged. His 
solution is to humanize the behavioral objectives process; 
he proposes five guidelines which are 
a pattern of objectives which would provide better 
than traditional guidance to teachers in their 
planning and to students in their study, and at the 
same time serve as no deterrent to humanism or the 
creativity which should characterize a free system 
of society and education. (p. 304) 
First, constructing objectives solely on the basis of 
their measurability is a mistake. Dumas is not opposed to 
measurability, but he is opposed to focusing only on 
educational outcomes that can be measured. He wrote that 
There are a great many bases for deciding the shape 
98 
of a curriculum--needs of youth, social problems which 
require resolution, the "structures" of the disciplines, 
perhaps--but "measurability," never. Rather, we should 
write the best objectives we can, according to 
legitimate bases for curricular development, then 
evaluate as best we can those things which we have 
specified in our objectives. (p. 305) 
Secondly, the objectives should be stated aE precisely 
as possible and should focus on the conceptual outcomes 
desired. Dumas rejected the use of unnecessarily vague 
objectives but added that "it is even more important that 
objectives not be stated so simply or so restrictively as 
to suggest that less learning or less complex learning is 
desired than is actually the case" (p. 305). 
The third guideline involves communication. "Stated 
objectives should be interpreted to students as a minimal 
statement of expectations, never as the outer limits of 
learning" (p. 305). 
The fourth objective is that 
Stated objectives cannot and need not attempt to be 
inclusive of all important tasks (facts or concepts) 
inherent in the materials to be read or the activities 
scheduled. Objectives for guiding study tend to be 
disregarded, or regarded with less care, in approximate 
proportion to their increasing number. (p. 306) 
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The final guideline involves evaluation. Dumas 
proposed that task mastery related to the stated objectives 
should be liberally sampled, but that it should not be 
limited to that. Other, unspecified learnings should also 
be evaluated if the objectives were communicated as minimal 
expectations. 
Cohen and Hersh (1972) have proposed a synthesis of 
behaviorism and humanism for teacher education which they 
call "behavioral humanism." They stated that a synthesis 
of these two approaches to education will avoid perpetuating 
"the needless dichotomies that characterize the discourse 
emanating from both rigid behaviorism and naive humanism" 
(p. 172). They assert that the foundation of a synthesis 
rests on the following four questions which apply to every 
educator regardless of ideology: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
What would I like each of my students to be able 
to do, know, and/or feel as a result of their 
experiences in my course? (goals) 
\vhat evidence do I have that a rry or all of these 
goals have merit for any student? (rationale) 
1,vhat instructional procedures can I employ to help 
each student obtain his goals? (instruction) 
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4. What evidence do I use to decide if goals are being 
attained? (assessment) (p. 172) 
The authors pointed out that the argument between 
behaviorists and humanists can be described around the four 
"critical questions" concerning goals, rationale, instruction, 
and assessment. 
In respect to the goals question the authors said that 
behaviorists have accused humanists of either refusing 
to admit that they have goals or stating them so· 
globally they become mere platitudes. Humanists, in 
turn, have accused behaviorists of trivializing 
education by relying on only the most easily observable 
and specifiable objectives. (p. 173) 
Additionally, the humanists have claimed that the behaviorists 
consistently neglect the affective domain and its effect on 
the educational process. Behaviorists have countered that 
attitudes, feelings, and values are accounted for by 
inferring their existence from observable behavior. 
Humanists argue that the behaviorists assume a value-
free orientation and ignore the question of rationale. They 
say that this can lead to a technology that may be used to 
accomplish goals that have no value. On the other hand, the 
behaviorists say that the humanists' goals sound high-minded 
but that there is little to support the notion that they can 
actually accomplish these goals with their approach. 
The authors wrote that disagreements between proponents 
of the two approaches also center on teaching processes. 
Humanists tend to accuse behaviorists of promoting 
programmed instruction as a panacea and of advocating 
a lock-step conditioning that smothers individual 
differences. Some humanists fear that a behavioral 
technology will produce robot-like responses from 
people incapable of making independent decisions or 
going beyond the information given. Behaviorists, 
on the other hand, have depicted humanists as either 
not concerned with questioning their instructional 
procedures or incapable of doing so systematically. 
(p. 173) 
Cohen and Hersh went on to describe the debate 
concerning assessment. 
Humanists have accused behaviorists of trying to fit 
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the \'lorld into a multiple-choice format. Behaviorists 
counter by saying that humanists evaluate their instruc-
tional effectiveness according to whether they feel 
good about it, or they don't evaluate it at all because 
they feel that the very evaluation process its.elf is 
dehumanizing. Humanists claim that behaviorists are 
content to measure only the trivial; behaviorists reply 
that all decisions are based on observed behavior and 
that rather than deny the measurement of human behavior 
one should strive to improve the range and skill of 
human assessment. (p. 174) 
The authors stated that a synthesis of humanism and 
behaviorism for teacher education connects a humanistic 
approach to goals and rationale with the behavioral view of 
instruction and assessment. This maximizes the strong points 
of each approach and at the same time minimizes their 
weaknesses. They wrote that "Where the humanists have been 
strong (direction of goals and rationale), the behaviorists 
have been weak; where the humanists have been weak (stating 
measurable goals and assessment), the behaviorists have been 
strong" (p. 174). This, then, is the essence of the 
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synthesis of behaviorism and humanism for teacher education 
that the authors proposed. 
Smith (1973) asserted that "behavior modification, if 
used humanistically, can be an effective tool for greater 
freedom, self-expression, and realization of potential" (p. 
60). She went on to address misconceptions about behavior 
modification by discussing four fallacies believed by 
humanistically oriented educators. 
First, "Control used in behavior modification 
procedures is harmful and inhumane" (p. 60). This is a 
fallacy, according to the author, because it is uncommon to 
find behavior modification techniques that employ aversive 
control, and the basic principles underlying the behavior 
approach bold that punishment is a relatively ineffective 
means of control. She addressed the issue of control in 
general and if its use is in itself antihumanistic. 
If \'le fail to exercise control, it is possible that 
we are being antihumanistic. If we have a procedure 
that can teach an autistic child to talk and enjoy 
playing with other children, or a "slo"t·' learner" to 
enjoy reading, are we not being antihumanistic not to 
use control? It can be argued that countless children 
are being denied life and work opportunities by 
scruples that arise out of so-called humanism. Failure 
to use systematic control must, in some cases, be 
regarded as abdication of responsibility. (p. 61) 
One often overlooked facet of control is that it is not a 
one-way process, either in the natural or behavior-managed 
environment. The reciprocal nature of control is such that 
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although the teacher may modify the students' behaviors, the 
students also modify the teacher's behavior. 
The second fallacy is that "Control in behavior modifi-
cation procedures always stems from some agent in the 
external environment" (p. 62). Smith pointed out that the 
ultimate aim of behavior modification is to encourage 
dependence on intrinsic rewards. She asserted that "almost 
without exception behavior modification programs evolve 
from a high dependence on external control, sometimes by 
primary reinforcers, toward the use of reinforcers like 
praise and approval, and ultimately toward self control" (p. 
62). She also commented on whether rewards for appropriate 
behavior constitute "bribery" and stated the opinion that 
this argument "is usually based on a desire for power on the 
part of the teacher or parent without regard for the child's 
wishes" (p. 63). 
The third fallacy -presented is that "Behavior modifi-
cation leads to the maintenance of the status quo and the 
present values, objectives, and methods of the school system" 
(p. 63). Most traditional classroom environments have a 
competitive atmosphere with winners and losers and thus deny 
to each individual the opportunity to realize his full 
potential. The behavioral approach, however, is 
individualized and resists the commonly held assumption 
that the pattern of group achievement must follow the 
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"normal curve." Smith sees behavior modification as likely 
to result in change in educstional systems rather than 
maintenance of the status quo. 
The fourth fallacy is that "Behavior modification is 
mechanistic in its insistence on precise measurement of 
behavior" (p. 65). The author stated that humanists 
perceive the measurement orientation of behaviorism as 
similar to monitoring the behavior of rats in Skinner boxes. 
She asserted that "the idea that measurement is inconsistent 
with a humanistic viewpoint is highly questionable" (p. 65) 
because behaviorists are more concerned with their own 
effectiveness in fostering meaningful change. "The prime 
concern of the behavior modifier is to do something that 
works. Good humanistic intentions of fostering love, 
freedom, and self-expression are not always enough to help 
children learn" (p. 65). 
Smith concluded by asserting that "there is no 
foundation for the view that behavior modification and 
humanism are not compatible" (p. 66). She stated that 
humanists who reject the behavioral approach may, in fact, 
be denying individuals opportunities for self-actualization 
and may be camouflaging their own resistance to change. 
The follo'l>ring is a definition of "models" and an 
explanation of an approach to dilemma reconciliation. 
Brubt:~.ker (1978) offered definitions for the terms 
"settings" and "models" and presented the basic assumptions 
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of the settings model, comparing them with the assumptions of 
the linear-sequential curriculum approach. Additionally, this 
writer suggested operational guidelines for the creation-of-
settings model. 
A setting is defined as "any instance when two or more 
persons who share certain goals form a covenant(s) for a 
period of time'' (p. 23), and model building is described as 
The process whereby one attempts to convey the 
essential features of a particular reality through a 
construct whose elements and their relationship to 
each other and the whole are described. The model 
can then lead to theories, experimental studies, and 
other forms of research. (p. 23) 
Brubaker discussed the basic assumptions of the 
creation-of-settings model, the goals of which include a 
psychological sense of community and a sense of personal 
worth. These assumptions center around the doing-being 
distinction, and the author asserts that "purely technical 
explanations and planning systems restrict one to the doing 
dimension of human interaction." This is restricting as 
"observable behavior" and the testable data that it 
generates become the focus and this, in turn, generates a 
"linear sequential problem-solving orientation." This 
orientation is closely tied to curriculum development and 
is characterized by the assumptions that "all issues are 
problems that can be solved with the proper use of resources; 
there is now or will be only one correct solution; and all 
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causes that led to the problem can be known." The problem-
solving orientation carries with it two myths about 
resources: first, that they are unlimited; and, second, 
that the most important resource is money. In addition, 
this approach "tends not to address 'basic' problems but 
rather seeks and defines problems with enou~h clarity so 
that unambiguously correct solutions will result" (p. 25). 
An alternative to the problem-solving P.pproach is the 
"dilemma-reconciliation" concept which recognizes that "many 
issues are dilemmas to be reconciled rather than problems 
to be solved which is to say that resources are limited and 
progress is not inevitable" (p. 26). Brubaker pointed out 
that "significant problems are usually part of larger 
dilemmas" (p. 29) and that questions may be framed so that 
problems will not necessarily be "solved" but framed in the 
context of larger questions. 
In Brubaker's model, "emerging goals and objectives and 
the hidden curriculum are as important as predetermined 
goals, objectives, and the observable curriculum" and "the 
realities of the Technocratic Age often work against rather 
than for the quality of personal and community life" (p. 26). 
The creation-of-settings model considers both the objective 
and subjective approaches as important; also, it bas the 
potential of not being limited by time and space. 
Praxis, or reflective action, is an overarching 
commitment that integrates the subjective and objective, the 
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scientific and non-scientific, acknowledges the doing-being 
distinction, and relates to the history of the setting. 
Other appropriate elements are also integrated through this 
reflective action. 
Praxis is the pr•ocess whereby the cognitive, affective, 
and psychomotor dimensions of learning are recognized 
and integrated. Praxis connotes the marriage of the 
theoretical and the applied, research and development, 
the university and the school. Specifically, praxis 
emphasizes relating one's actions to reflections 
concerning such actions. I"ti recognizes the limitations 
of thinking that falls short of doing and the limitations 
of doing without reflecting. (p. 28) 
The author then listed seven operational guidelines that 
are designed to stimulate the development of other guidelines 
to aid the educator in planning, implementing, and 
evaluating. The guidelines are designed to aid in planning 
and spontaneity: 
1. Be aware of the problem-solving and dilemma-
reconciliation modes of thinking; 2. Recognize that 
it is impossible to predict and control all creation 
of settings processes at all times and that furthermore 
it is undesirable to act as if you can; 3. Acknm·rledge 
that much more will occur in creating a setting than 
you (and others) can observe; 3.1 Try to relax in 
relating to the mystery of settings for this mystery 
can be a stimulant for discovery of self, other 
persons and the environment. In this process shape 
~oals, learning activities, and evaluation to this 
reality; 3.2. Give attention to intentionality as the 
source of vitality in personal relationships; 4. Relate 
to the history and culture of the setting by being 
a\'rare of the language of the setting as well as 
symbols, rituals, and myths associated \'lith the 
setting; 5. Be aware of the leadership process and in 
particular the formation of the core group by noting 
leaders' views as to who can and should participate 
in the leadership process and the rank order in which 
core group members are chosen; 6. Be sensitive to the 
the many resources available through informal 
channels; and, ?. Recognize the inevitability of 
change, the relatedness of settings elements to 
each other and the whole setting and the symbiotic 
relationship between personal growth and the growth 
of the setting. (p. 30) 
Curriculum Ideas 
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The related literature has represented two relatively 
broad issues which have concerns central to this paper. The 
first I termed "Curriculum Conflict," a dra rna tic character-
ization for a professional field that could benefit from 
the addition of drama if it is, as Huebner said, moribund. 
The literature appearing in that section demonstrated that 
curriculum i.s a diverse field that is extending in different 
directions, one of '\'lhich is tm'lard a more complete embodiment 
of either behavioral or humanistic psychological models for 
curriculum work. The dilemma arising from attempting to 
select one model at the cost of the _other has been examined 
and seen to parallel a similar dilemma in the psychological 
literature. 
The second issue has been literature relating to the 
reconciliation of the behavioral-humanist dilemma. These 
collected descriptions showed that a number of "'ri ters are 
optimistic about the possibilities of unifying, to some 
extent, these two approaches. This literature validated 
the assumption that behaviorism and humanism can be reconciled, 
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and that this reconciliation has important implications for 
curriculum processes. 
The literature has reflected a variety of notions about 
curriculum, education, and psychology. Included were the 
ideas that education and psychology are multidimensional and 
that educators cannot afford to ignore psychological 
research. Curriculum and instruction were said to be 
inseparable and curriculum was presented within the context 
of learning. It was asserted that either behavioral or 
humanistic models have the potential for misuse and that 
they are vulnerable to criticism on this point. It was 
pointed out that the conflict between behaviorists and 
humanists is based to some degree on misunderstanding and 
terminological confusion. Additionally, it was asserted 
that significant problems, such as the behavioral-humanist 
controvery, are usually part of a larger dilemma. 
During the writing of this paper I have experienced 
the dilemma posed by my own objectivity and subjectivity in 
the selection of appropriate literature, and then in the 
reporting of that selected literature. At times I have 
assumed a Staatsian perspective and experienced a subjective 
awareness of my work as an original combination of various 
behaviors in my collection acquired through classical and 
operant conditioning processes. At other times, Gelso's 
ideas about alternating subjective and objective states 
seem to describe my operation. Occasionally I am 
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metaphorical: taking in the nutrients of encounter and data, . 
and growing as a result. Most of the ~ime, however, I have 
a pervasive feeling that my behavior is influenced by 
simultaneous and interacting objective and subjective 
conditions. For example, ·there seems to be an inescapable 
convergence when I attempt to understand my own behavior and 
feelings. I question whether I am subjectively observing 
my own objectivity, or objectively viewing my own subjec-
tivity. Additionally, I question what happens when I attempt 
to extend my own observations to other events and persons. 
Perhaps it is possible, for a brief period, to observe pure 
objective behavior or to experience pure subjective 
emotions, although I see it as more likely that a convergence 
is occurring somewhere on a continuum between the two. The 
dilemma posed by my own objectivity and subjectivity is 
somewhat resolved by my awareness of their simultaneity and 
interactivity. These processes have transformed the 
literature treated into something that is part of my personal 
curriculum that I see as worth extending as a possible 
contribution to a field thst interests me. 
As a way of tying together this collection of literature, 
ten ideas about curriculum are proposed. These represent the 
combinations which best summarize the essence of the 
literature that provides assumptions for developing a model. 
First, behavioral and humanistic approaches are 
compatible and reconcilable. One cannot be reduced to the 
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other, but they can be viewed as multiple realities 
coexisting in a universe of other realities. The objective 
perspective is simultaneous and interactive with the 
subjective perspective and has convergent and transformative 
effects. 
Second, the behavioral-humanist dilemmas in psychology 
and education are parallel and related. The extension of 
psychological thought in this area is beneficial for 
curriculum thinking. 
Third, the polarization of behavioral and humanistic 
positions has resulted in an unproductive stalemate which 
adds little, if anything, to educational practice. This 
conflict is not constructively answering Huebner's questions 
about the relationship between educators and the not yet 
educated. 
Fourth, change seems inevitable and both behavioral 
and humanistic approaches are potent processes for change. 
Resistance to either, or both, may camouflage authori-
tarianism. Related to.this is the question of whether 
authoritarianism has a place in curriculum and educational 
processes. It is my opinion that authoritarianism is 
pervasive in contemporary schooling and is detrimental to 
educational processes. 
Fifth, curriculum can be conceptualized psycholo~ically; 
behavioral and humanistic approaches emphasize the 
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environment, relationships, and learning. Of course, there 
can be other psychological conceptions of curriculum also. 
Sixth, curriculum cannot be separated from instruction; 
curriculum and instruction cannot be separated from 
education; and, education cannot be separated from the 
societal and cultural context in which it occurs. 
Seventh, the most vital aspects of curriculum and 
education are content and process; however, neither is 
paramount. 
Eighth, behaviorists and humanists agree that learning 
is an individual process, and is both overt and covert. 
That learning is an individual process is almost common 
kno\'Tledge, so why is this fact commonly ignored? 
Ninth, values are central to curriculum and educational 
processes and must be explored situationally and contextually 
by all persons involved in the educational enterprise. That 
includes everybody--policy makers, curriculum workers, 
teachers, administrators, and students--and goes beyond 
tryinG to determine who is a "level one" and who is a "level 
six," or whatever. Rather, an effort to determine \'That 
values are reflected by educators' behavior may clarify 
covert values. 
Tenth, the most prevalent type of behavioral-humanist 
reconciliation is a synthesis of humanistic goals and 
rationale ,,.lith behavioral procedures and assessment. This 
shows that other \'Torkable reconciliations are also possible. 
CHAPrER III 
TOWARD A RECONCILIATION 
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The literature related to this essay, and reviewed in 
the preceding chapter, shows that the behavioral-humanistic 
dilemma in curriculum and instruction can be reconciled. 
This chapter consists of two main components related to that 
reconciliation. 
First, three approaches to reconciliation will be 
explained and illustrated 't'Ti th figures. A synthesizing 
approach, a simultaneous approach, and a convergent approach 
will all be described. They will be presented as a broad set 
of alternatives for conceptualizing the reconciliation of the 
behavioral-humanistic dilemma in curriculum and instruction 
and can be considered exploratory and tentative. They will 
not be tied together in a model that is characterized as 
"comprehensive"; however, their complementarity should be 
apparent. 
Second, it will be suggested that the frameworks 
presented will be transcended eventually, and several new 
directions for going beyond current frameworks will be 
listed. Additionally, seven recommendations for action and 
research centering around the reconciliation of the behavioral-
humanistic dilemma in curriculum and instruction will be 
suggested, and a brief epilogue will be presented. 
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The Synthesizin~ Approach 
B.ynthesizing is one approach to the reconciliation of 
the behavioral-humanistic dilemma in curriculum and 
instruction. Synthesizing is a process in which separate 
elements are combined to form a new, coherent whole. The 
separate elements are arbitrary, so this process has the 
potential for generating numerous and diverse approaches to 
curriculum and instruction. 
It was indicated in the revie'\'r of the literature that 
the most prevalent synthesis of these two models is a 
combination of humanistic goals and rationale 't·rith behavioral 
procedures and assessment. From this conception, the 
follm'ling elements can be specified as a starting point for 
synthesizing: (1) goals, that is, the changes in behavior, 
thoughts, and feelings as a result of the curriculum and 
instruction experience; (2) rationale, that is, the reasons 
that these changes have merit; (3) process or techniques, 
specified here as being from the teacher's or curriculum 
\'rorker 's perspective. In other words, what does the teacher 
or curriculum \'lorker do to bring about these chanGes?, and 
(4) assessment or evaluation, that is, what is the relation-
ship of processes and techniques to goals? 
The second set of elements for this synthesis are 
behavioral and humanistic approaches. It could be argued 
that humanists would resist the incorporation of their 
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approach into the four-part curriculum conception; however, 
the elements are only being suggeste~, and there is nothing 
inherently behavioral about them. Both sets of elements can 
be combined so that any one of the first four (goals, 
rationale, process or techniques, and assessment or evalu-
ation) can be either behavioral or humanistic. Sixteen 
possible permutations result, listed in Figure 1. 
A brief explanation of the behavioral and humanistic 
approaches to each of the four elements is summarized below: 
(1) From the behavioral perspective, goals are 
specified changes in observable behavior. These changes 
are not necessarily specified by the curriculum worker on 
an a priori basis; they may be the result of mutual agreement 
among teachers and students. The goal of curriculum and 
instruction, from the humanistic perspective, is self-
initiated, significant learning. 
(2) Rationale for the goals, stated behaviorally, is 
the acquisition of behavior that is useful to the learner 
and his or her culture. The humanistic rationale for goals 
can be described as adaptation and learning how to learn. 
(3) Process or techniques from the behavioral perspec-
tive is the arrangement of contingencies of reinforcement, 
preferably nonaversive. This approach may be a rigorous and 
systematic employment of behavioral procedures or, as the 
review of the literature suggests, a conceptual and less 
overt awareness of behavioral processes. Humanistic 
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technique is the expression of attitudes that facilitate 
change and learning. These attitudes include genuineness, 
warmth, and empathy in the teacher-student interpersonal 
relationship. This element has been described from the 
curriculum worker's or teacher's point of vie't·r because these 
syntheses focus on what those persons do. From the learner's 
point of view, process will be experienced as effective, 
individualized, and participatory rather than behavioral or 
humanistic. Of course, a person may learn behavioral and 
humanistic approaches through process and technique. 
(4) Assessment or evaluation from the behavioral 
perspective is a relatively objective measurement of 
observable behavior change. Objective criteria may include 
samples of behavior or the products of the learner's 
behavior. The humanistic approach to assessment and 
evaluation would employ subjective criteria defined by the 
individual student. It would be inaccurate to assert that 
either approach focuses more or less on behavior or 
emotions in assessment and evaluation. 
11? 
PROCESS or ASSESSI•lENT or 
GOALS RATIONALE TEC_!!NIQUE EVALUATION ---
1. Humanistic Humanistic Humanistic Humanistic 
2. Humanistic Humanistic Humanistic Behavioral 
3. Humanistic Humanistic Behavioral Humanistic 
4. Humanistic Humanistic Behavioral Behavioral 
5. Humanistic Behavioral Humanistic Humanistic 
6. Humanistic Behavioral Humanistic Behavioral 
?. Humanistic Behavioral Behavioral Humanistic 
B. Humanistic Behavioral Behavioral Behavioral 
9. Behavioral Humanistic Humgnistic Humanistic 
10. Behavioral Humanistic Humanistic Behavioral 
11. Behavioral Humanistic Behavioral Humanistic 
12. Behavioral Humanistic Behavioral Behavioral 
13. Behavioral Behavioral Humanistic Humanistic 
14. Behavioral Behavioral Humanistic Behavioral 
15. Behavioral Behavioral Behavioral Humanistic 
16. Behavioral Behavioral Behavioral Behavioral 
FIGURE 1. The Synthesizing Approach 
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~ext, the sixteen possible permutations of this 
particular synthesizing approach to curriculum and instruc-
tion will be outlined. For convenience, each synthesis will 
first be identified by its corresponding number on Figure 1 
and then a four-letter abbreviation identifying each element 
(goals, rationale, process or technique, and assessment or 
evaluation) as either behavioral (B) or humanistic (H). For 
example, the fourth synthesis combining humanistic goals and 
rationale with behavioral processes or techniques and 
behavioral assessment or evaluation will be identified as 
(4) H-H-B-B. 
(1) H-H-H-H. Curriculum and instruction conceptualized 
as having the goal of self-initiated, significant learning; 
the rationale for the goal as adaptation and learning how to 
learn; with a process that emphasizes the teacher's 
expression of attitudes which facilitate change and learning; 
and evaluation with subjective criteria. This is a pure 
non-synthetic approach which humanists assert is a feasible 
model. 
(2) H-H-H-B. Curriculum and instruction conceptualized 
as having the goal of self-initiated, significant learning; 
the rationale for the goal as adaptation and learning how to 
learn; with a process that emphasizes the teacher's 
expression of attitudes which facilitate change and learning; 
and assessment with objective criteria. This synthesis is 
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feasible with the focus on who is assessing the first three 
elements and why. 
(3) H-H-B-H. Curriculum and instruction conceptualized 
as having the goal of self-initiated, significant learning; 
the rationale for the goal as adaptation and learning how to 
learn; with the teacher arranging non-aversive contingencies 
of reinforcement; and evaluation with subjective criteria. 
This synthesis appears feasible if approached from the 
conceptual level of behaviorism. In other words, the teacher 
and student may not target behavior changes in advance, but 
rather the teacher will be aware of the consequences of his 
or her actions, analyzed behaviorally, in the teaching 
process. 
(4) H-H-B-B. Curriculum and instruction conceptualized 
as having the goal of self-initiated, significant learning; 
the rationale for the goal as adaptation and learning how to 
learn; with the teacher arranging non-aversive contingencies 
of reinforcement; and assessment with objective criteria. 
This is the synthesis identified in the review of the 
literature as the most popular and emergent reconciliation 
of the behavioral-humanistic dilemma. In fact, this is not 
incongruent with the early operant approach of dealing with 
emitted behavior. 
(5) H-B-H-H. Curriculum and instruction conceptualized 
as having the goal of self-initiated, significant learning; 
with the rationale for the goal as the acquisition of 
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behavior that is useful to the learner and his or her 
culture; with a process that emphasizes the teacher's 
expression of attitudes that facilitate change and learning; 
and evaluation with subjective criteria. The interesting 
aspect of this possible synthesis is that the behavioral 
rationale for the humanistic goal does not appear incongruent. 
(6) H-B-H-B. Curriculum and instruction conceptualized 
as having the goal of self-initiated, significant learning; 
with the rationale for the goal as the acquisition of 
behavior that is useful to the learner and his or her 
culture~ with a process that emphasizes the teacher's 
expression of attitudes that facilitate chan~e and learning; 
and assessment with objective criteria. 
(7) H-B-B-H. Curriculum and instruction conceptualized 
as having the goal of self-initiated, significant learning; 
with the rationale for the goal as the acquisition of 
behavior that is useful to the learner and his or her 
culture; with the teacher arranging nonaversive contingencies 
of reinforcement; and evaluation with subjective criteria. 
(8) H-B-B-B. Curriculum and instruction conceptualized 
as having the goal of self-initiated, significant learning; 
with the rationAle for the ~oal as the acquisition of 
behavior that is useful to the learner and his or her 
culture; with the teacher arranging nonaversive contingencies 
of reinforcement; and assessment with objective criteria. 
It could be said that this synthesis is similar to a 
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behavioral model that deals with emitted rather than elicited 
behavior, although some covert goals may exist from the 
teacher's perspective. 
(9) B-H-H-H. Curriculum and instruction conceptualized 
as having the goal of mutually specified changes in 
observable behavior; with the rationale for the goal as 
adaptation and learning how to learn~ with an emphasis on 
the teacher's expression of attitudes that facilitate change 
and learning; and evaluation lfri th subjective criteria. 
(10) B-H-H-B. Curriculum and instruction conceptu-
alized as having the goal of mutually specified changes in 
observable behavior; with the rationale for the goal as 
adaptation and learning how to learn; with a process that 
emphasizes expression of attitudes that facilitate change 
and learning; and assessment with objective criteria. 
(11) B-H-B-H. Curriculum and instruction 
conceptualized as havin~ the goal of mutually specified 
changes in observable behavior; with the rationale for the 
goal as adaptation and learnin~ how to learn; with the 
teacher arranging nonaversive contingencies of reinforcement; 
and evaluation with subjective criteria. This synthesis 
suggests that some form of subjective evaluative criteria 
such as self-report can be employed in conjunction ~ith goals 
that specify observable behavior. 
(12) B-H-B-B. Curriculum and instruction concep-
tualized as having the goal of mutually specified changes in 
observable behavior; with the rationale for the goal as 
adaptation and learning how to learn; with the teacher 
arranging nonaversive contingencies of reinforcement; and 
assessment "'i th objective criteria. 
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(13) B-B-H-H. Curriculum and instruction conceptua-
lized as having the goal of mutually specified changes in 
observable behavior; with the rationale for the goal as the 
acquisition of behavior that is useful to the learner and his 
or her culture; with a process that emphasizes the teacher's 
expression of attitudes that facilitate change and learning; 
and evaluation with subjective criteria. 
(14) B-B-H-B. Curriculum and instruction 
conceptualized as having the goal of mutually specified 
changes in observable behavior~ with the rationale for the 
goal as the acquisition of behavior that is useful to the 
learner and his or her culture~ with a process that 
emphasizes the teacher's expression of attitudes that 
facilitate change and learning; and assessment with 
objective criteria. 
(15) B-B-B-ll. Curriculum and instruction concep-
tualized as having the goal of mutually specified changes 
in observable behavior; with the rationale for the goal as 
the acquisition of behavior that is useful to the learner 
and his or her culture; with the teacher arranging 
nonaversive contingencies of reinforcement; and assessment 
with subjective criteria. 
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(16) B-B-B-B. Curriculum and instruction conceptua-
lized as having the goal of mutually specified changes in 
observable behavior; with the rationale for the goal as the 
acquisition of behavior that is useful to the learner and 
his or her culture; with the teacher arranging nonaversive 
contingencies of reinforcement; and assessment with 
objective criteria. This is a nonsynthetic behavioral 
approach to curriculum and instruction. 
All but the first and the last of these permutations 
represent possible synthetic reconciliations of the 
behavioral-humanistic dilemma in curriculum and instruction. 
Of the fourteen possible syntheses, only one, the fourth, 
has been described in the literature reviewed for this 
paper. The remaining thirteen are feasible approaches to 
curriculum and demonstrate that a reconciliation is possible 
through a synthesizing approach. These syntheses are 
presented to illustrate the synthesizing approaches; any 
number of other syntheses are possible depending on the 
number of curriculum elements employed. 
The fourteen syntheses presented here differ primarily 
in focus and emphasis and offer a set of alternative synthetic 
approaches for educational practice and research. Nany 
questions can be raised b:v the s .. rnthesizing approach. For 
example, what is the effect of behavioral assessment on an 
othervlise humanistic curriculum approach? Or, what is the 
effect of humanistic evaluation on an otherwise behavioral 
curriculum approach? 
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The language used in this section to describe behavioral 
and humanistic conceptions of goals, rationale, process or 
techniques, and assessment or evaluation was selected from 
the writings of behaviorists and humanists in the review of 
the literature. It is noteworthy that the language can be 
interpreted as representing both multiple realities, by 
distinctions, and convergence through similarity. 
Next, approaches to the reconciliation of the behavioral-
humanistic dilemma by simultaneity and convergent approaches 
will be described. 
The Simultane~~proach 
The behavioral-humanistic dilemma in curriculum and 
instruction can be reconciled by conceptualizin~ curriculum 
and instruction as a set of elements that have simultaneous 
behavioral and humanistic qualities. The simultaneous 
approach differs from the synthesizing approach which 
specifies that the curriculum and instruction elements are 
either behavioral or humanistic, in a discrete manner. 
A simultaneous approsch accommodates the possibility 
that any curriculum element can be described, or characterized 
as behavioral and humanistic at the same time. For example, 
self-initiated learning goals stated in terms of observable 
behavior are both behavioral and humanistic. Also, ·the 
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acquisition of behavior useful to the learner and his or her 
culture which includes adaptation and learning how to learn 
is, at the same time, behavioral and humanistic. Likewise, 
the teacher who expresses the attitudes of genuineness, 
warmth, and empathy while arranging nonaversive teaching 
contingencies demonstrates a simultaneity which denies a 
description of his or her process or techniques as behavioral 
or humanistic. Additionally, assessment and evaluation that 
is both subjective and objective, as in self-report, shows 
behavioral and humanistic qualities at the same time. From 
this perspective, the discreteness of synthetic models 
begins to dissolve. 
A sketch of how an approach to simultaneity in 
curriculum and instruction might look appears in Figure 2. 
This figure incorporates the same curriculum elements 
specified in the synthesizing approach (goals, rationale, 
process or techniques, and assessment or evaluation); 
however, they are depicted as existing on a set of inter-
connected continua. Any one of the curriculum elements 
could be described as being located at some point on a 
continuum bet\'leen either the behavioral pole on the left or 
the humanistic pole on the right. Each element has 
characteristics that reflect both behavioral and humanist 
perspectives simultaneously as coexisting multiple realities. 
Perhaps a scale could be developed to accurately identify 
the degree to which an element is behavioral and/or 
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humanistic in any particular curriculum and instruction 
situation. It is beyond the scope of this paper to construct 
such an instrument; however, a direction can be suggested. 
Perhaps it would be possible to develop some type of 
inter-rater reliability index based on an instrument 
constructed to assess or evaluate the behavioral and/or 
humanistic characteristics of elements in curriculum schemes 
such as this. Some objective computation of a coefficient 
of correlation of the subjective evaluations of various 
observers and/or participants as to the characteristics of 
each curriculum element could be produced. This is a 
tentative suggestion, although attempts to evaluate a 
simultaneous approach to a behavioral-humanistic reconcili-
ation in curriculum and instruction could be illuminating, 
if successful. 
The Convergent Approach 
A third approach to the reconciliation of the behavioral-
humanistic dilemma in curriculum and instruction can be 
described as the convergent approach. Behavioral and 
humanistic concepts can be represented as converging on 
curriculum practice from two different directions. 
For example, behavior and consciousness can be 
conceptualized as meeting and joining in curriculum and 
instruction practice. In the same way, objectivity and 
127 
BEHAVIORAL •••••••.•••.••••..•••••••••••••••••••••• HUHANISTIC 
GOALS 
Behavior 
1
.- Internal 
Change ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Change 
RATIONALE 
Behavior Adaptation, 
Acquisition •••••••.•••••••••.•••••••••••.••••••• How to Learn 
PHOCESS-TECHIHQUES 
Arranged Interpersonal 
Contingencies ••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••• Relationship 
ASSESSME~~-EVALUATION 
Objective Subjective 
Criteria •••••••••••••••••••••• ••••••••••••••••••••Criteria 
FIGURE 2. The Simultaneous Approach 
subjectivity, predictability and unpredictability, 
rationality and arationality, sameness and uniqueness, 
absoluteness and relativity, particles and the whole, the 
scientific and the ascientific, realities and potentials, 
and participation and observation travel from behavioral 
and humanistic modular perspectives and converge in 
curriculum practice. Figure 3 illustrates this idea. 
~8 
A convergent approach to the reconciliation of the 
behavioral-humanistic dilemma in curriculum and instruction 
differs from both synthesizing and simultaneous approaches 
in that it is a general insight rather than a practical 
application. However, it is suggested that the simultaneous 
approach is temporal and the convergent approach is spatial. 
Intentionally, no particular curriculum elements such as 
goals, and so forth, are identified and specified in the 
description of this approach. The other two approaches 
described imply a convergence of behavioral and humanistic 
concepts in curriculum practice, and the convergent approach 
is included here as a conceptual tool to illustrate that 
implication. 
A convergent approach implies the possibility of a 
divergent analysis of any particular curriculum and 
instruction setting. Each settin~ could be examined; the 
characteristics of the setting could be broadly identified 
as behavioral and/or humanistic, end then divergently 
dispersed to their respective conceptual models. Of course 
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some elements would be dispersed to synthetic or simultaneous 
models suggested in this paper. The remaining phenomena in 
the setting could be closely examined and identified. 
Authoritarianism and aversive processes and structures that 
hinder learning could be clearly identified and dealt with. 
Likewise, humanitarianism and other processes and structures 
that enhance the practice of curriculum and instruction 
could be recognized and preserved. 
~eyond Frameworks 
The approaches described were selected and presented 
with the presumption that they were relatively stable and 
understandable frameworks. These frameworks are congruent 
contemporary curriculum and educational practice and 
incorporate accepted psychological vie\'rs of human 
functioning. However, it is reasonable to assume that both 
curriculum and psychology will eventually break out of 
current frameworks and that new constructs and approaches 
will appear. After all, frameworks are convenient conceptual 
tools arbitrarily created as aides to understanding and 
action; as a society evolves, so does its frameworks. 
The new frameworks in curriculum may include such 
elements as an environmental emphasis, the distribution of 
educational capital, a spiritual approach to human beings, 
or an electronic approach to education. Psychology also is 
growing and evolving. New frame\'lorks are appearinG and 
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isolated constructs are being examined within the context 
of other constructs. Neither behavioral nor humanistic 
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approaches are finished in terms of their evolution, and it 
has been asserted in this essay that their isolation itself 
is a problem. Perhaps a unification of the t,.,o approaches 
will never occur, but they may be subsumed under new frame-
works that incorporate both approaches, and others, into ne\<1 
vie\'IS of human beings and curriculum perspectives. 
The reconciliation of the behavioral-humanistic dilemma 
in curriculum is a start· in a ne\'r direction, and the approach 
has been to deal with old problems. Action and research are 
needed in this area and may yield fruitful results. 
Recommendations 
The follo\'ring seven recommendations for research and 
action are suggested as startin3 points for the.further 
exploration of the behavioral-humanistic dilemma in 
curriculum and instruction and its resolution. 
(1) The reconciliation of the behavioral-humanistic 
dilemma in curriculum and instruction should receive 
greater attention in the literature. 
Methodologies that can be employed in further research 
have been suggested by Brubaker (1981). First, autobio-
graphical and biographical statements of persons exploring 
the reconciliation of behavioral and humanistic approaches 
in education may be collected and published. Second, 
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linguistic analyses may reveal how language as a symbol 
system affects attitudes and behavior centering around a 
reconciliation of behavioral and humanl~tic approaches to 
curriculum. Third, research may focus on the personalities 
of organizations. It bas been suggested that a divergent 
analysis of behavioral and humanistic organizational 
elements may be fruitful. Fourth, the continuing develop-
ment of curriculum frameworks and models within a 
reconciliation approach can be a useful avenue for further 
research. 
(2) Practical applications arising from the reconcili-
ation of the behavioral-humanistic dilemma should be 
operationalized in educational settings. 
A number of educators familiar with the topic of this 
essay have made comments to the effect that they have 
reconciled behavioral and humanistic approaches in the 
classroom in a naturalistic manner. This suggests one 
"theory to practice" pathway for implementation of the 
approaches suggested in this paper. Educators interested 
in trying out or testing the approaches explicated in this 
essay could collect empirical and nonempirical data arising 
from the implementation of the suggested syntheses. These 
da·ca could be analyzed to help determine \•rorkable 
reconciliations. 
(3) A more complete embodiment of behavioral and 
humanistic models of education should be applied to 
educational practice, both singly and together. 
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A major difficulty with the application of both models 
to educational practice has been the employment of 
"behavioral" or "humanistic" approaches that conveniently 
discard troublesome elements such as the idea that learning 
is an individual process. 
(4) Each educator should learn as much as he or she 
can about behavioral and humanistic approaches, and then 
attempt to resolve the dilemma in his O\<Tn educational 
settings. 
(5) Psychological concepts, especially behavioral 
and humanistic, should be emphasized more in educational 
research and practice. 
(6) Preservice teacher education and staff development 
should focus on behavioral and humanistic models and their 
reconciliation. 
Application clinics can be designed and offered as 
alternative activities in teacher education and staff 
development. 
(7) Going beyond current frameworks can be seen as 
an exciting, challenging set of tasks for educational 
practitioners and researchers. 
1~ 
Epilogue 
Many unanswered questions remain in my mind, so it is 
difficult for me to end this essay. For example, are 
behavioral and humanistic approaches ever fully reconcilable 
within some framework? If so, what is that framework? Or, 
are behavioral and humanistic approaches essentially the 
same, that is, constructs that attempt to explain some 
larger reality? If so, what is that reality? 
Although I am ending this project with feelings of 
uncertainty and tentativeness, I feel as though a 
contribution has been made by exploring an area that bas 
received little attention in the literature. It bas been 
demonstrated that behavioral and humanistic approaches to 
curriculum can be reconciled, at least to the extent that 
such a reconciliation can be a fruitful new perspective 
for curriculum theory and practice. 
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